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Shadow Citizens:  Felony Disenfranchisement 




The disenfranchisement of felons has long been challenged as anti-
democratic and disproportionately harmful to communities of color.  
Critiques of this practice have led to the gradual liberalization of state 
laws that expand voting rights for those who have served their sentences.  
Despite these legal developments, ex-felons face an increasingly difficult 
path to regaining the franchise.  This article argues that, for ex-felons in 
particular, criminal justice debt can serve as an insurmountable obstacle 
to the resumption of voting rights and broader participation in society.  
This article uses the term “carceral debt” to identify criminal justice 
penalties levied on prisoners, “user fees” assessed to recoup the 
operating costs of the justice system, and debt incurred during 
incarceration, including mounting child support obligations. 
In recent years, another disturbing voting rights challenge has 
emerged that has received little attention from scholars.  State appellate 
and federal courts across the country have affirmed the constitutionality 
of statutes that require ex-felons to satisfy the payment of all carceral 
debts in order to resume voting privileges.  Such a paradigm has a clearly 
differential impact on the poor:  if only those who can pay their debts 
after a criminal conviction can regain the right to vote, those who cannot 
will remain perpetually disenfranchised, rendering them “shadow 
citizens” and raising a host of policy and constitutional questions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Debt is the slavery of the free. 




 is a crisis of democracy.  An estimated 
5.85 million Americans, or 2.5 percent of the total U.S. voting age 
population, have lost the right to vote in some capacity in all but two 
 
 1. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE LEVEL 
ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 (2012), 
available at http://bit.ly/NkIVsc; see also JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED 
OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY vii (2006) (“[W]e use 
the phrase ‘disenfranchisement’ to describe the loss of voting rights [arising from a 
felony conviction].  This usage is predominant in the contemporary scholarly and 
journalistic literature.  However, in the extensive nineteenth-century debates over the 
extension or contraction of the franchise, ‘disfranchisement’ was the sole word used to 
describe the loss of voting rights, and most historians still employ that word today.  Most 
dictionaries consider the two words identical.”). 
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states because they have a criminal conviction.
2
  Powerful critiques by 
activists and scholars alike have highlighted the anti-democratic and 
racially disproportionate effects
3
 of shrinking electoral participation.
4
  
This article will demonstrate that, for ex-felons in particular, the problem 
of mounting criminal justice debt can also serve as an insurmountable 
 
 2. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://bit.ly/PdAXY8 [hereinafter FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS].  The Sentencing Project reports that 48 states and the 
District of Columbia prohibit inmates from voting while incarcerated for a felony 
offense.  Only two states, Maine and Vermont, permit inmates to vote.  In addition, 35 
states prohibit persons on parole from voting, and 30 of these states exclude persons on 
probation as well.  Four states deny the right to vote to all persons with felony 
convictions, even after they have completed their sentences.  Eight others disenfranchise 
certain categories of ex-offenders and/or permit application for restoration of rights for 
specified offenses after a prescribed waiting period.  See NICOLE D. PORTER, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: STATE FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
REFORM, 1997-2010, at 1 (2010). 
 3. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (persuasively arguing that mass incarceration has 
created a racial caste system where a significant segment of subordinated communities is 
relegated to second class citizenship by social exclusion stemming from criminal 
convictions); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in 
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1292 (2004) (“The geographic 
concentration of mass incarceration translates the denial of individual felons’ voting 
rights into disenfranchisement of entire communities.”); S. David Mitchell, Undermining 
Individual and Collective Citizenship: The Impact of Exclusion Laws on the African-
American Community, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 833 (2007) (arguing that felon exclusion 
laws are not race neutral and that the application of the laws has a racially discriminatory 
effect and should be abolished); Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and its 
Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1147 
(1994) (noting that felon disenfranchisement laws disproportionately affect the black vote 
to a significant degree). 
 4. See, e.g., MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 74; JAMIE FELLNER & MARC 
MAUER, HUM. RTS. WATCH & THE SENTENCING PROJ., LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF 
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1998) [hereinafter LOSING 
THE VOTE], available at http://bit.ly/QvhjUz (arguing that the scale of felony voting 
disenfranchisement in the United States is far greater than in any other nation and has 
serious implications for democratic processes and racial inclusion); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate Over Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (2004) (“Virtually every contemporary 
discussion of criminal disenfranchisement in the United States begins by noting the sheer 
magnitude of the exclusion, and its racial salience.”); Note, The Disenfranchisement of 
Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and ‘The Purity Of The Ballot Box,’ 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1300, 1301 (1989) [hereinafter Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons] (arguing felony 
disenfranchisement is an act of scapegoating and self-delusion and is therefore 
illegitimate as a policy); Eric J. Miller, Foundering Democracy: Felony 
Disenfranchisement in the American Tradition of Voter Exclusion, 19 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 
32, 33-34 (2005) (“Felony disenfranchisement is a national scandal. . . .  [It] reveals the 
theoretical underpinnings of an exclusionary version of American democracy in which 
more or less widespread disenfranchisement is an acceptable or necessary political 
tactic.”).  But see Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 172 
(2001) (“It is not unreasonable to suppose that those who have committed serious crimes 
may be presumed to lack this trustworthiness and loyalty.”). 
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obstacle to the resumption of voting rights and broader participation in 
society. 
Voting rights advocates are correctly intent on eradicating state laws 
that disenfranchise felons.
5
  However, if the goal for felons who have 
“paid their debt to society” is the restoration of social citizenship,6 then 
this is an incomplete strategy.  A focus on direct disenfranchisement 
obscures the broader discourse about access to economic resources that 
are becoming increasingly scarce, a problem largely exacerbated by mass 
criminalization.
7
  For example, even if universal suffrage suddenly 
manifested, ex-felons would still be unable to navigate the vast array of 
civil barriers that present unique challenges to political and economic 
survival after being convicted of a crime.  Criminal convictions set in 
motion a variety of social conditions and regulatory schemes that are 
mutually and negatively reinforcing and, taken together, render convicted 
felons “shadow citizens.”8  It is useful to envision a dual paradigm for 
these key exclusionary features:  first, informal obstacles arising from 
social subordination; and second, formal legal barriers to voter 
 
 5. See McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 (S.D. Miss. 1995) 
(“The United States Supreme Court has chosen to apply the strict scrutiny standard to 
voting because of the significance of the franchise as the guardian of all other rights.”).  
Although it is true that concerted efforts to repeal onerous disenfranchisement laws is not 
a complete solution, the repeal of these laws would in fact have a significant positive 
effect by allowing the transfer of advocacy resources toward the goal of addressing other 
obstacles to citizenship. 
 6. The term social citizenship, as used here, is derived generally from British 
Sociologist T.H. Marshall’s theory of social citizenship, which articulates the notion that 
public well-being in a democratic society depends on economic security, in addition to 
political and civil rights.  T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 10-11 (1950); 
see Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal 
Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 784 (2003) (arguing that social citizenship 
stands against a powerful and pervasive neoliberal ideology which asserts that state 
abstention from economic protection is the foundation of a good society); see also 
MARTIN BULMER & ANTHONY M. REES, CITIZENSHIP TODAY: THE CONTEMPORARY 
RELEVANCE OF T.H. MARSHALL (1996). 
 7. See discussion infra Part II and accompanying notes (discussing the social, 
political, and economic context that inform obstacles to re-enfranchisement). 
 8. By using the term citizen in this context, the author does not intend to ignore the 
subject of nation-state citizenship.  This article, though it does not confront the issue of 
immigration, does not use the phrase social citizenship in any exclusionary sense 
whatsoever, including against non-citizens.  See McCluskey, supra note 6, at 797 
(“[F]raming the debate over economic welfare questions as social citizenship risks 
solidifying the exclusionary boundaries of national citizenship that reflect some of 
history’s biggest moral failures.”).  Rather, the author intends to frame citizenship within 
a broader socio-economic paradigm than is currently contemplated in the dominant 
formalist conception of equality.  See ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE 
LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 2 (2001) (“[A]ntidiscrimination law has 
also . . . sustained a deep insensitivity to entrenched social inequalities.”). 
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restoration based on debt that serves as “back door” voter 
disenfranchisement. 
Informal obstacles are informal in the sense that they do not exist in 
law with the express purpose of directly inhibiting access to the vote.  
Rather, they are propounded through practice, custom, and indirect 
regulation of the lives of ex-felons.
9
  They function to stagnate a person’s 
ability to exercise broader participation in society, which is contrary to 
society’s implicit promise of redemption for those convicted of crimes.10  
The first of these obstacles is stigma that redounds to the detriment of 
convicted felons; such stigma developed historically within a race 
paradigm and persists because of the development of a race-neutral 
jurisprudence that gives rise to mass incarceration.
11
  Moreover, race is 
intertwined with the question of class status, specifically poverty, which 
serves as a self-perpetuating drag on social mobility in the context of 
criminalized communities.  A second major obstacle is the wide range of 
civil legal disabilities, or what is commonly known as “collateral 
consequences.”  These are legal barriers arising from criminal 
convictions, which limit access to various aspects of citizenship such as 
voting, but which also include barriers to employment, housing, and 
other critical life supports.
12
  The third are Kafkaesque state re-
enfranchisement processes that prisoners must navigate to restore voting 
privileges.  These processes are often so onerous that the Justice 
Department has described them as “a national crazy-quilt of 
disqualifications and restoration procedures.”13  Finally, for people in the 
criminal justice system, a distinct and potent obstacle has emerged in the 
form of untenable “carceral debt,”14 a term this article uses to describe 
civil debt associated with criminal justice penalties or debt incurred 
during incarceration, or both.  Much of this debt is euphemistically 
referred to as “user fees” that attempt to recoup from prisoners the 
operating costs of the criminal justice system.  These fees are not 
connected to the underlying crime in the way that restitution or fines are, 
but rather are part of state cost-recovery systems.  Nevertheless, these 
invisible surcharges are imposed on convicts at every stage of criminal 
 
 9. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. 
 10. The Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008), is 
national legislation with broad bi-partisan support, which is designed to improve 
outcomes for people returning to communities from prisons and jails. 
 11. See discussion infra Parts I.B, II.A. 
 12. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 13. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE & SUSAN M. KUZMA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL 
DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 1 (1996), available at 
http://1.usa.gov/QyAafc. 
 14. “Carceral, adj., of or belonging to a prison.”  OXFORD ONLINE ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, http://bit.ly/RIVHmp (last visited Oct. 18, 2012). 
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justice processing and can become a substantial obstacle to reentry.
15
  
Notably, this debt is borne by those least able to pay, foreshadowing a 




Informal obstacles are but one aspect of the modern re-
enfranchisement paradigm.  Debt also routinely hinders the formal 
resumption of voting rights after criminalization, even after state 
disenfranchisement schemes no longer serve that function.  Restrictive 
re-enfranchisement statutes have quietly supplanted the lifetime 
disenfranchisement statutes that heretofore served as direct prohibitions 
on voting by felons, but which are now slowly disappearing.  Despite 
these important developments, debt-related re-enfranchisement barriers 
have received surprisingly little attention from scholars.
17
  In recent 
years, courts across the country have affirmed the constitutionality of 
statutes that require felons to satisfy the payment of carceral or other 
debts in order to resume voting privileges.
18
  Interestingly, child support 
debt has recently emerged as a specific obstacle to re-enfranchisement, 
as is demonstrated in Johnson v. Bredesen,
19
 wherein the Sixth Circuit 
upheld a Tennessee statute that authorizes an exception to re-
enfranchisement when petitioners are not current in child support 
obligations.
20
  Remarkably, the court upheld the constitutionality of this 
 
 15. Recidivism rates are extraordinarily high.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
reports that, in a 15-year study, 67.5% of released prisoners were rearrested within 3 
years.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REENTRY TRENDS IN THE 
U.S. 20 (2002). 
 16. Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 
DAEDALUS 8, 14 (2010) (arguing that incarceration significantly reduces economic 
opportunities). 
 17. A few student comments have explored the subject.  See, e.g., Jill E. Simmons, 
Comment, Beggars Can’t Be Voters: Why Washington’s Felon Re-Enfranchisement Law 
Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 78 WASH. L. REV. 297 (2003); Cherish M. Keller, 
Note, Re-Enfranchisement Laws Provide Unequal Treatment: Ex-Felon Re-
Enfranchisement and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199 (2006); 
Jason H. Weber, Comment, Equal Protection—Felon Disenfranchisement Scheme That 
Requires Completion of All Terms of Sentence Including Full Payment of Any Legal 
Financial Obligations Is Constitutional Under Both Washington’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, 39 
RUTGERS L.J. 1101 (2008); J. Whyatt Mondeshire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The 
Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 435 (2001). 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.A and accompanying notes. 
 19. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 20. Id. at 745.  The Code 
restores felons’ eligibility “to apply for a voter registration card and have the 
right of suffrage restored” upon receipt of a pardon, discharge from custody 
after serving the maximum sentence imposed, or final discharge by the relevant 
county, state, or federal authority.  The statute, however, carves out two 
exceptions to re-enfranchisement eligibility.  It provides that: (b) . . . a person 
shall not be eligible to apply for a voter registration card and have the right of 
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particular statute even though child support debt typically has no 
connection to the underlying criminal conviction for which an individual 
has been disenfranchised. 
To date, voter restoration statutes that require the payment of 
criminal justice-related debt have been routinely upheld, even as they 
restrict access to the vote, because payment of criminal justice debt is 
deemed rationally related to legitimate state interests, an extremely 
deferential constitutional standard.
21
  Such a paradigm has a clearly 
differential impact on the poor:  if only those who can pay their debts 
after a felony conviction can regain the right to vote, those who cannot 
will remain perpetually disenfranchised.  This paradigm, therefore, raises 
a host of constitutional questions.
22
 
The emerging debt paradigm also has troubling implications for the 
adoption of future civil schemes that might further restrict post-
conviction social and political participation for people in poverty.  
Theoretically, almost any debt can become a barrier to the resumption of 
voting rights, so long as the debt is criminalized.
23
  Imprisonment for 
failure to pay a fine, restitution, or court costs can occur when repayment 
is made a condition of probation or parole and the defendant defaults.  In 
an era of continued fiscal crisis, it is ever more likely that failure to pay 
consumer debts will begin to factor into this equation.  Although debtors’ 
prison has long been abolished for civil debt,
24
 failure to pay consumer 
debt now mimics a criminal act, as many people are legally subject to 
arrest due to their inability to satisfy the terms of their financial 
obligations.  This dynamic triggers inappropriate contact with the 
criminal justice system and raises the specter of an emerging twenty-first 
century debtors’ prison. 
Part I of this article will set forth the shocking scope of mass 
criminalization and will situate American disenfranchisement law and 
 
suffrage restored, unless the person has paid all restitution to the victim or 
victims of the offense ordered by the court as part of the sentence [, and] (c) . . . 
a person shall not be eligible to apply for a voter registration card and have the 
right of suffrage restored, unless the person is current in all child support 
obligations. 
Id.; see also TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-29-202 (a)-(c) (2010). 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 22. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 754 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes. 
 24. Id.; see also Recent Legislation: Criminal Law—Alabama Raises The Rates at 
Which Individuals in Jail for Non-Payment of Fines Earn Out Their Debts—H.B. 95, 
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002) (codified at Ala. Code § 15-18-62 (1995 & Supp. 2002)), 116 
HARV. L. REV. 735, 735 (2002) (“Incarceration for ‘public,’ not ‘private,’ debts is 
typically not considered ‘imprisonment for debt’ within the meaning of state 
constitutional prohibitions, however, and in the many states that incarcerate individuals 
for their failure to pay fines, debtor’s prison is in effect neither antique nor alien.”). 
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policy within a discourse of democratic participation for ex-felons.  Next, 
it will describe the historical roots and purposes of civil disabilities or 
“civil death,” and will briefly chart the progressive expansion of the 
suffrage class over time to include many marginalized groups, except 
felons.  Part I will also explain modern conceptions of felony 
disenfranchisement jurisprudence by exploring the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional approval of state disenfranchisement laws through the 
foundational case of Richardson v. Ramirez,
25
 a case that relies on a 
narrow textual reading of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
justify state disenfranchisement schemes.
26
  Although this section of the 
Amendment was designed to force Confederate states to permit African 
Americans citizenship after the Civil War, Richardson, in the modern 
era, has given way to a race-neutral interpretation that sanctions the 
denial of voting rights to all felons by obviating the requirement of 
heightened scrutiny for their voting rights claims.  Such an interpretation 
exacts a particularly high toll on African American communities. 
Part II of this article will explore the first part of the dual paradigm 
that has led to “shadow citizens”:  informal obstacles to re-
enfranchisement.  Such obstacles include (1) class and race stigma and 
the disproportional burden of incarceration; (2) civil collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions; (3) onerous re-enfranchisement 
processes that discourage voter restoration; and (4) the emergence of 
debilitating “carceral” debts, including criminal justice legal financial 
obligations (LFOs) and child support debt incurred during incarceration.  
All of these overlapping and interrelated aspects of subordination serve 
to create informal, but nonetheless profound, barriers to the restoration of 
political citizenship through the right to vote, as well as the pursuit of 
broader socio-economic citizenship expressed through roadblocks to 
successful reintegration. 
In Part III, this article will then explore the second paradigm of 
exclusion:  formal legal barriers to re-enfranchisement arising from 
criminal justice-related debt obligations.  This Part will trace a recent 
trajectory in the law of re-enfranchisement, where courts have routinely 
upheld statutes that condition felon re-enfranchisement itself on the 
payment in full of fines, restitution, court fees, and other debt.  Such 
statutes serve as a barrier to re-enfranchisement even after a state’s 
restrictive disenfranchisement laws have been amended.  This Part will 
 
 25. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 26. The second section of the Fourteenth Amendment refers specifically to voters in 
the southern states disenfranchised for “participation in rebellion, or other crime.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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further examine the expansion of the conditions that limit voter 
restoration, which now extend to payment of child support obligations. 
Finally, Part IV will challenge the continuation of these policies 
even under rational basis analysis, the most deferential standard of 
review.  This article takes the position that statutes creating wealth-based 
conditions, which directly discriminate against poor ex-felons and 
burden their right to vote, should fail to survive a rational basis review 
based on a range of pragmatic legal and policy arguments.  This article 
will conclude with envisioning the future of our emerging debt paradigm 
by exploring the modern trend of criminalizing debt in this era of fiscal 
crisis and mass criminalization. 
I. DISENFRANCHISEMENT AS A COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE OF 
CRIME 
The growing number of people directly affected by mass 
incarceration puts the scope and impact of voter disenfranchisement into 
perspective.  The prison population in the United States currently stands 
at more than 2.3 million.  According to a report by the Pew Charitable 
Trust, this statistic amounts to a 1:100 ratio of all adults in the United 
States.
27
  In the aggregate, including all probationers, parolees, prisoners, 
and jail inmates, America now holds more than 7.3 million adults under 
some form of correctional control.
28
  As the report notes, “That 
whopping figure is more than the populations of Chicago, Philadelphia, 
San Diego and Dallas put together, and larger than the populations of 38 
states and the District of Columbia.”  People who are convicted of 
felonies, in every state except Maine and Vermont, will be confronted 
with some limitations on their right to vote.
29
  Thus, in the context of 
widespread imprisonment, concerns about the implications for 
democracy are not specious.  Limited participation in U.S. democratic 
processes is in stark contrast to European countries, where the debate is 
centered around which prisoners should be barred from voting, not how 
long states should deny suffrage after release.
30
  Moreover, the 
 
 27. The United States outstrips China, which is far more populous.  The United 
States imprisons five to eight times as many people as other western democracies.  PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUST, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5 (2008), available at 
http://bit.ly/PdJ9YA. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS, supra note 2. 
 30. ERIKA WOOD, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., RESTORING THE RIGHT TO VOTE 5 
(2009) (“In almost all cases, the debate stops at the prison walls. . . .  While researchers 
differ over how to categorize certain laws, in most European nations, some or all 
prisoners are entitled to vote; in the remainder (mainly countries of the former Eastern 
Bloc), prisoners are barred from voting but are generally re-enfranchised upon release.”); 
see also MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 41 (“Felon disenfranchisement laws in the 
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disproportionate impact on African Americans has caused some to 
question whether disenfranchisement has a legitimate purpose or whether 
the paradox created by vote suppression in minority communities runs 
counter to fundamental equality principles.
31
 
A. Historical Dimensions 
The disenfranchisement of convicts is not a modern concept but 
rather derives its roots from ancient Greece where “[c]riminals 
pronounced infamous were prohibited from appearing in court, voting, 
making speeches, attending assemblies, and serving in the army.”32  
Indeed, the American system is heir to the common law concept of 
disenfranchisement inherited from Europeans during the medieval era.  
In England, “[A] person pronounced ‘attainted’ after conviction for a 
felony or . . . treason [faced] forfeiture corruption of the blood [meaning 
that land owned by the criminal would pass not to heirs but to king or 
lord], and loss of civil rights.”33  As political scientist Alec Ewald notes, 
“[T]hese practices were known in England as ‘civil death,’ and the 
attainted criminal was said to be ‘dead in law’ because he could not 
perform any legal function—including, of course, voting.”34 
English colonists in North America incorporated these civil 
disabilities into statutes—the impact of which varied greatly depending 
on the types of offenses that would qualify for suspending rights—and 
also in designating the length of time for loss of “freeman” status and the 
ballot.
35
  Nonetheless, what was clearly contemplated during the early 
 
United States are unique in the democratic world.  Nowhere else are millions of offenders 
who are not in prison denied the right to vote.”). 
 31. See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 834-35 (noting felon exclusion laws relegate 
African Americans to second class citizenship); see also Miller, supra note 4, at 33 
(“[F]elony disenfranchisement is most readily comprehensible as a means of reserving 
political participation for a privileged social and intellectual class.”). 
 32. See Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059-60 (2002); 
see also Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 4, at 1301; see also FELLNER & 
MAUER, supra note 4. 
 33. See Ewald, supra note 32, at 1060 n.45 (citing Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren 
Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender’s Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 
11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721 (1972)). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Indeed, Ewald states: 
In Plymouth the diminishment seems to have been permanent, but Connecticut 
law stated that “good behaviour shall cause restoration of the privilege.”  In 
both Massachusetts and Connecticut, the decision to restore voting rights was 
left to the court, but in pre-Revolutionary Rhode Island, anyone convicted of 
bribing an election official was “forever thereafter . . . excluded from being a 
Freeman, or voting, or bearing an public Office, whatsoever, in this Colony.” 
Id. at 1062. 
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disenfranchisement period was the punitive and public purpose of the 
laws.
36
  Ewald observes this dynamic: 
Originally, the removal of criminals from the suffrage had a visible, 
public dimension; its purposes were articulated in the law; and it was 
a discrete element in punishment which required the deliberation of 
courts to implement.  Moreover, crimes subject to the penalty of 
disenfranchisement were either linked to voting itself . . . or defined 
as egregious violations of the moral code.
37
 
Stated differently, disenfranchisement law originally resulted from 
specific violations of the moral code rather the general status of felon, as 
is the case with modern disenfranchisement.
38
 
As Ewald insightfully notes, “[A]merican political thought has 
always been characterized by paradoxes of inclusion and exclusion.”39  
As such, the exclusionary purposes of civil disabilities were brought to 
bear on convicted felons from the outset, justified by a variety of social 
theories questioning the moral competency of felons to exercise the 
franchise.
40
  Even so, voting was a privilege reserved for few.
41
  During 
the colonial period and in the aftermath of the American Revolution, 
franchise rights were vested only in white, male property owners over the 
age of 21;
42
 and exclusionary practices arising from felony convictions 
would logically apply only to them.  People outside of this narrow class 
of “citizens” had no voting rights whatsoever.  Nevertheless, over time, 
voting privileges would be extended to larger segments of the 
population, including all classes, racial minorities, women, and young 
adults.
43




 36. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 162-63 (2000) (“[T]he punitive thrust clearly was 
present for much of the nineteenth century.”). 
 37. See Ewald, supra note 32, at 1062.  Conversely, Ewald opines, “Modern 
disenfranchisement laws—automatic, invisible in the criminal justice process, considered 
‘collateral’ rather than explicitly punitive, and applied to broad categories of crimes with 
little or no common character—do not share any of these characteristics.”  Id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 1045. 
 40. See discussion infra Part IV.A and accompanying notes. 
 41. Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 50 (Marc Mauer 
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter Mass Imprisonment] (noting that, at the 
founding of the republic, the vote was “granted to only wealthy white male property 
owners who represented only 120,000 of the 2 million ‘free’ Americans, not counting the 
more than one million slaves and indentured servants.”). 
 42. Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to 
Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2003) (providing an excellent history of the 
expansion of voting rights through war efforts). 
 43. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 2.  Constitutional provisions and 
statutes expanded the franchise for groups other than propertied white males.  See U.S. 
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ultimately through legislation, each time providing for expansion of the 
suffrage class.  For example, after the Civil War ended, Congress passed 
a number of Reconstruction Amendments between 1865 and 1870 to 
ensure that newly freed slaves would not be denied basic entitlements.  
These post-Civil War Amendments included the Thirteenth Amendment, 
which abolished slavery;
45
 the Fourteenth Amendment, the source of the 
due process and equal protection limitations on the exercise of state 
power;
46
 and the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited the denial of 
the right to vote on account of race or color.
47
  Each of these 
Amendments were intended to shore up rights that were critical for the 
exercise of citizenship in the post-war landscape. 
Despite this enlargement of voting power, specifically for African 
American men, laws that mandated criminal disenfranchisement also 
existed concurrently in most jurisdictions.
48
  By the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, 29 States had provisions in their 
constitutions that prohibited, or authorized the legislature to prohibit, 
voting by persons convicted of felonies or “infamous crimes.”49  Further, 
though franchise rights were extended to newly freed slaves after the 
Civil War, states soon after enacted “Black Codes” to control freedman 
by transforming criminal codes into legislation that specifically targeted 
 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (linking representative apportionment to the right of all male 
citizens at least 21 years of age to vote, ostensibly granting the franchise to non-white 
citizens); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (protecting the right of citizens to vote regardless 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting 
women the right to vote); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (protecting the right of citizens 
to vote regardless of ability to pay any poll or other tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 
(granting citizens 18 years of age and older the right to vote); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006) (prohibiting tests or devices to determine voter eligibility, the 
alteration of voting qualifications and procedures, and the denial of the right to vote on 
account of race or color). 
 44. See Karlan, supra note 42, at 1345-46.  Karlan contends: 
[W]hile the conventional story of the right to vote in America describes a 
pattern of gradual and inevitable progress . . . that is not what happened.  The 
history of right to vote in America is one of expansion and contraction . . . 
rather than gradual evolution. 
Id. at 1345.  She also notes that “virtually every major expansion in the right to vote was 
connected intimately to war.”  Id. at 1346.  See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 36 
(asserting that the primary factor promoting the expansion of the suffrage has been war 
and the primary factors promoting contraction or delaying expansion have been class 
tension and class conflict). 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 48. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 41-44. 
 49. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974).  In Richardson, the Court 
notes that the majority of states had disenfranchisement laws at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s enactment. 
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Blacks.
50
  In this context, it is interesting to note that the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolished slavery, also made an exception for 
punishment for those convicted of a crime.
51
  Criminal 
disenfranchisement, along with terror and violence, was routinely used in 
the South after Reconstruction to suppress the votes of African 
Americans.
52
  Outright voter suppression through these means continued 
for nearly a century until the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.
53
  The passage of the Voting Rights Act finally secured the voting 
rights of African Americans, which the Fifteenth Amendment originally 
guaranteed. 
B. Modern Disenfranchisement Law 
In the modern era, criminal disenfranchisement laws persist and 
largely withstand constitutional scrutiny.
54
  Courts closely analyze the 
constitutionality of state restrictions on the right to vote under 
fundamental rights jurisprudence.
55
  Since voting has been deemed a 
 
 50. ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY!: AN AMERICAN HISTORY VOL. II 535 (2d ed. 
2009) (noting that the Black Codes were laws that granted freedman certain rights “but 
denied them the right to testify against whites, serve on juries or in state militias, or to 
vote . . . [t]he Black codes declared that those who failed to sign yearly labor contracts 
could be arrested and hired out to white landowners.”); see also Angela Y. Davis, 
Racialized Punishment and Prison Abolition, in THE ANGELA Y. DAVIS READER 96, 100 
(1998) (“[T]he Black Codes . . . criminalized such behavior as vagrancy, breech of job 
contracts, absence from work, the possession of firearms, insulting gestures or acts. . . .”); 
ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 28 (“Although . . . convict laws . . . are rarely seen as part 
of the black codes, that is a mistake . . . the main purpose of the codes was to control the 
freedman, and the question of how to handle convicted black lawbreakers was very much 
at the center of the control issue.”). 
 51. Section 1 provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, 
§ 1 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Ryan S. Marion, Prisoners for Sale: Making the 
Thirteenth Amendment Case Against State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 213, 214 (2009) (“As such, the Punishment Clause renders any current 
prisoner’s argument that they are slaves or involuntary servants void and frivolous.”). 
 52. See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to 
Vote: Did The Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 
GEO. L.J. 259, 261 (2004) (“Criminal disenfranchisement was widely used in the South 
after Reconstruction to suppress the vote of African-Americans.”).  It is important to note 
that the Fifteenth Amendment did not grant suffrage to African American women, or any 
other women for that matter.  That right came pursuant to the ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, which prohibited denial of the right to vote based on 
sex.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 53. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 54. The exception is for laws enacted for a racially discriminatory purpose.  See 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985). 
 55. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
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fundamental right,
56
 states must show that restrictions on voting are 
necessary pursuant to a compelling governmental interest, are narrowly 
tailored, and are the least restrictive means of achieving the state’s 
objective.
57
  However, felon disenfranchisement laws have been 
exempted from the standard fundamental rights/equal protection analysis 
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v. Ramirez.58 
In Richardson, the Court upheld felon disenfranchisement laws 
under Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Section Two”), a 
provision that was never previously enforced.
59
  Section Two provides, 
in relevant part: 
“[W]hen the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens. . . .”
60
 
The Supreme Court in Richardson construed Section Two as 
granting states an “affirmative sanction” to disenfranchise anyone 
convicted of criminal offenses, an interpretation that arises solely from 
the reference to “rebellion, or other crime.”61  In a narrow textual 
reading, the Court concluded that the language of Section Two “is as 
much a part of the Amendment as any of the other sections, and how it 
became a part of the Amendment is less important than what it says and 
what it means.”  Justice Thurgood Marshall vehemently objected to this 
 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see also 
LOSING THE VOTE, supra note 4, at 18. 
 56. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). 
 57. The Court recognized voting as a fundamental right and directed courts to apply 
strict scrutiny, stating, “[A]ny alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be 
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”  Id. at 562. 
 58. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  See Karlan, supra note 4, at 1153-
54; see also Chin, supra note 52, at 313; FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 18. 
 59. See Chin, supra note 52.  Chin asserts:  “[T]his clause was designed to 
encourage former Confederate states to enfranchise African-Americans by excluding 
former slaves from the state’s population for the purpose of apportioning Congress if 
former slaves were denied the right to vote.”  Id. at 259.  He notes, “[Y]et . . . no 
discriminating state lost even a single seat in the House of Representatives when 
Congress reapportioned itself.”  Id.  Chin goes on to assert, “Congress proposed the 
Fifteenth Amendment in 1869 because Section 2 had failed.”  Id. at 260-61.  
Consequently, he concludes that, rather than being consistently unenforced because of 
federal indifference to Jim Crow, the explanation for its disuse is that it was effectively 
repealed upon ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870. 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 61. See Chin, supra note 52, at 261 (“The Court reasoned that Section 2 . . . was 
inapplicable if individuals were disenfranchised for conviction of “rebellion [] or other 
crime.”); Karlan, supra note 4, at 1154. 
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interpretation and issued a stinging dissent.
62
  Agreeing that felon 
disenfranchisement was commonplace in nineteenth century America, 
Justice Marshall nonetheless decried the majority’s literal application of 
the clause as unauthorized by the purpose or language of the provision,
63
 
noting the following: 
“It is clear that [Section] 2 was not intended and should not be 
construed to be a limitation on the other sections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Section 2 provides a special remedy-reduced 
representation to cure a particular form of electoral abuse—the 
disenfranchisement of Negroes.  There is no indication that the 
framers of the provisions intended that special penalty to be the 
exclusive remedy for all forms of electoral discrimination.
64
 
Justice Marshall was referencing the primary goal of the clause, 
which was to create incentives for Confederate states to participate 
voluntarily in extending the vote to their newly freed former slaves.  As 
Marshall explained, “Section 2 . . . put Southern States to a choice—
enfranchise Negro voters or lose congressional representation.”65  
Nevertheless, in Richardson, the Court’s construction of Section Two 
had the effect of affirming the constitutionality of state 
disenfranchisement laws generally.  In doing so, the Court negated the 
need to apply strict scrutiny in any analysis of voting rights based solely 
on state disenfranchisement statutes.  As the logic goes, if felons are 
expressly precluded from the right to vote by the Amendment, then a 
 
 62. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56 (“The Court today holds that a State may strip ex-
felons who have fully paid their debt to society of their fundamental right to vote without 
running afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 63. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, opines: 
The historical purpose for [Section] 2 itself is, however, relatively clear and, in 
my view, dispositive of this case.  The Republicans who controlled the 39th 
Congress were concerned that the additional congressional representation of the 
Southern States which would result from the abolition of slavery might weaken 
their own political dominance.  There were two alternatives available—either 
to limit southern representation, which was unacceptable on a long-term basis, 
or to insure that southern Negroes, sympathetic to the Republican cause, would 
be enfranchised; but an explicit grant of suffrage to Negroes was thought 
politically unpalatable at the time.  Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was the resultant compromise.  It put Southern States to a choice-enfranchise 
Negro voters or lose congressional representation. 
Id. at 73-74; see also FONER, supra note 50, at 538 (“The Fourteenth Amendment offered 
the leaders of the white South a choice allow black men to vote and keep their state’s full 
representation in the House of Representatives, or limit the vote and sacrifice part of their 
political power.”). 
 64. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 74. 
 65. See Chin, supra note 52, at 259. 
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fundamental right to vote does not exist for them.
66
  Richardson remains 
good law and is a critical obstacle in contemporary voting rights law.
67
  
Because of Richardson, individuals with felony convictions remain the 
primary exception
68




II. INFORMAL OBSTACLES AS SUBORDINATION 
A. The Persistence of Race and Class in Mass Incarceration 
1. Disparate Racial Impact 
Throughout much of U.S. history, the power to vote has been 
intertwined with the hopes and aspirations of African Americans.  This 
remains the case today.  The Fourteenth Amendment was the centerpiece 
of legislation designed to guarantee due process to freedmen after 
centuries of servitude.  As historian Eric Foner aptly notes, “[T]he 
Reconstruction Amendments transformed the Constitution from a 
document primarily concerned with federal-state relations and the rights 
of property into a vehicle through which members of vulnerable 
minorities could stake a claim to freedom and protection against 
misconduct by all levels of government.”70  Indeed, the great irony of 
Richardson is that an Amendment adopted in the wake of the Civil War 
to guarantee the franchise to African Americans would later be 
 
 66. Richard W. Bourne, Richardson v. Ramirez: A Motion to Reconsider, 42 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2007).  Bourne conducts an exhaustive analysis of the legislative history of 
Section 2 and argues that the Court misread the section.  He concludes that Section 2 
“should not be construed as an explicit endorsement of felon disenfranchisement statutes, 
much less as an authorization for the states to adopt them.”  Id. at 1. 
 67. In Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), the Court clarified that felon 
disenfranchisement laws are not entirely immune from all Equal Protection challenges, in 
particular if they are enacted for an impermissible, racially discriminatory purpose.  In 
Hunter, the Court struck down an Alabama provision that disenfranchised persons 
convicted of crimes “involving moral turpitude.”  The Court cited the unusual selection 
of crimes and legislative history demonstrating that the constitutional provision was 
enacted with the purpose of disenfranchising blacks.  The Hunter Court held that felon 
disenfranchisement laws that are enacted with “the desire to discriminate” against 
persons on account of race and that in fact have a discriminatory effect violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Id. at 233; see also Chin, supra note 52, at 261. 
 68. Another exception, not relevant for the purposes of this article, includes those 
deemed mentally incompetent.  See Shepard v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 
1978) (noting that felons, “like insane persons, have raised questions about their ability to 
vote responsibly”). 
 69. Note that this expansion, in this context, contemplates only U.S. citizens in their 
capacities as residents in the United States. 
 70. FONER, supra note 50, at 541 (“Many of the Supreme Court decisions expanding 
the rights of American citizens were based on the Fourteenth Amendment, including the 
Brown decision that outlawed school desegregation.”). 
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interpreted by the Supreme Court in a way that severely limits the voting 
power of minorities well into the twenty-first century.
71
 
Of all minority groups, laws that disenfranchise have a particularly 
onerous effect on African Americans,
72
 who make up approximately 13 
percent of the population but comprise 40 percent of the prison 
population.
73
  With respect to mass incarceration, analyses of its root 
causes and its racialized impact abound in legal literature.
74
  But, as 
asserted by legal scholar Michelle Alexander, race-neutrality in 
disenfranchisement law masks the impact of political dislocation and 
powerlessness in low-income communities of color.
75
  As a result, the 
disproportional effect of crime on African Americans appears to be 
primarily self-caused, rather than the result of interlocking criminal 
justice policies that specifically plague African Americans.
76
  Moreover, 
challenges to felony disenfranchisement under the disparate impact 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act
77
 have been largely unsuccessful as a 
strategy to combat the onerous effects of mass incarceration on African 
 
 71. See Bourne, supra note 66, at 4; see also Chin, supra note 52, at 261. 
 72. Ewald, supra note 32, at 1054 (“Criminal disenfranchisement policy in the 
United States is located squarely at the intersection of voting rights and criminal justice—
and it is tainted by the racial history of both policy areas in the United States.  Despite its 
roots in liberal and republican ideologies, this Article concludes, criminal 
disenfranchisement runs contrary to the essential commitments of modern American 
political thought.”). 
 73. CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & LINH VUONG, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY, CREATED EQUAL: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2009) (“African Americans make up 13% of the general US 
population, yet they constitute 28% of all arrests, 40% of all inmates held in prisons and 
jails, and 42% of the population on death row.”); see also HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM 
J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008—STATISTICAL TABLES 
17 (2009), available at http://1.usa.gov/XDcBHo (reporting that, in 2008, 60% of 
2,103,500 inmates in state or federal prisons, or in local jails, were Black or Hispanic). 
 74. See, e.g., MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999) (recounting runaway 
growth in the number of prisons and noting overreliance on imprisonment to stem 
problems of economic and social development); see Ewald, supra note 32, at 1048 
(“[T]he most powerful critique of criminal disenfranchisement begins by appreciating the 
policy’s deep roots in American political ideology. . . .  [O]nly a combination of 
contractarian liberal, civic-virtue republican, and racially discriminatory ideologies 
explains the persistence of criminal disenfranchisement in the United States.”). 
 75. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 196-97. 
 76. See id. at 180-82 (providing an excellent summary of criminal justice policies 
that ensnare black communities, primarily resulting from the “War on Drugs”); see also 
Marc Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, in 
MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 4, 12 (David Garland ed., 
2000) (“The most significant change within the criminal justice system is the loss of the 
individual in the sentencing process, as determinate sentencing and other ‘reforms’ have 
taken us from an offender-based to an offense-based system.”). 
 77. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
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Americans.
78
  As Alexander points out, “[M]ore African Americans are 
under correctional control today—in prisons or jail, on probation or 
parole—than were enslaved in 1850.”79  In another shocking statistic, 
Alexander further notes, “[M]ore [black men] are disenfranchised today 
than in 1870, the year the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified.”80  All told, 
13 percent of all African American men today have been permanently 
disenfranchised under state laws.
81
  Moreover, about 30 percent of 




The politics of social exclusion brought about by 
disenfranchisement has an impact that transcends any given individual 
who is denied the franchise.  Denial of voting rights has a profound 
influence on entire communities through vote dilution and further 
economic displacement from the redistribution of federal resources.
83
  
Thus, mass incarceration does not simply remove human resources from 
neighborhoods but also redirects financial resources, which are tied to 
population, away from these same disadvantaged neighborhoods.  Mass 
incarceration also redirects political power:  in the 2010 census, 
incarcerated individuals are counted by the U.S. Census Bureau at the 
locations where they are incarcerated rather than at their prior addresses 
in their home communities.
84
  As the Brennan Center for Justice has 
 
 78. Federal courts have differed on whether, and how, the Voting Rights Act applies 
to felony disenfranchisement.  The Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts have held that the Act 
applies, whereas the Second and Eleventh Circuits have held that it does not.  See MANZA 
& UGGEN, supra note 1, at 226-27 (“The debate focuses on the meaning of the racial 
disparity. . . .  Given the failure of the numerous legal challenges and the uncertainty of 
theories based on the VRA . . . proponents of re-enfranchisement have had far less 
success in the courts than they have had in state legislature.”). 
 79. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 175. 
 80. See id.; see also Karlan, supra note 42, at 1371 (“In 1870, the Fifteenth 
Amendment safeguarded the opportunity to vote of slightly less than one million black 
men.  Today, felon disenfranchisement statutes deny that opportunity to nearly 1.4 
million black men.”).  No doubt, the number of black men disenfranchised is even higher 
today. 
 81. See Felony Disenfrachisement, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://bit.ly/2E9sID 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“An estimated 5.3 million Americans are denied the right to 
vote because of laws that prohibit voting by people with felony convictions.  Felony 
disenfranchisement is an obstacle to participation in democratic life which is exacerbated 
by racial disparities in the criminal justice system, resulting in 1 of every 13 African 
Americans unable to vote.”). 
 82. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 119; see infra Part II.B. 
 83. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 1292 (“Excluding such huge numbers of citizens 
from the electoral process substantially dilutes African American communities’ voting 
power.”); see also Harvey, supra note 3, at 1147. 
 84. See U.S. Census and Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 
http://bit.ly/RRev6t (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“These two addresses are usually far 
from each other, and coupled with the nation’s rising incarceration rate, lead to a 
systematic distortion of the population picture.”). 
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shown, prison districts contain “ghost voters, prisoners who count toward 
the district size but who, with few exceptions, are not permitted to vote 
and who, with few exceptions, have no connection whatsoever to the 
other residents of the district.  This situation artificially inflates the 
political power of residents in prison districts, and artificially deflates the 
power of residents everywhere else,”85 especially the beleaguered 
neighborhoods of prisoners’ origins.86 
The effects of mass incarceration are self-perpetuating.  An 
emerging theory among political scientists argues that “concentrated 
inequality exacerbates existing patterns of criminal justice punishment”87 
and suggests that the “perceptions of dangerousness attached to 
stigmatized and spatially concentrated minority groups [in particular, 
African Americans] . . . increase the intensity of both unofficial beliefs 
about social disorder and official decisions to punish through 
incarceration.”88  Accordingly, prisoners from communities of 
concentrated disadvantage “are themselves stigmatized and are more 
likely to be incarcerated when compared to those in less disadvantaged 
communities with similar crime rates,”89 thus demonstrating the 
perpetuation of subordination.  Professor Dorothy Roberts posits three 
main theories that explain the social mechanisms through which mass 
incarceration harms the African American communities where it is 
 
 85. See id. (internal quotations omitted).  As the Brennan Center notes: 
[T]he skew can become quite extreme: in 2006, for example, voters in three of 
the city council wards of Anamosa, Iowa, were busily engaged in the 
democratic process. But 1300 of the 1358 individuals allotted to ward 2 were 
incarcerated—and so the city councilman was elected with one write-in vote 
from his wife and one from his neighbor. 
Id.  While this situation is an anomaly, it demonstrates the potential for antidemocratic 
voting tied to census counting practices.  However, in recent months, “The U.S. Census 
Bureau has agreed to identify which census blocks contain group quarters such as 
correctional facilities as early as May 2011, so that state and local redistricting bodies can 
choose to use this data to draw fair districts and avoid prison-based gerrymandering.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 86. See, e.g., Eric Cadora et al., Criminal Justice and Health and Human Services: 
An Exploration of Overlapping Needs, Resources, and Interests in Brooklyn 
Neighborhoods, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND 
REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 285 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle 
Waul eds., 2003). 
 87. Robert J. Sampson & Charles Loeffler, Punishment’s Place: The Local 
Concentration of Mass Incarceration, 139 DAEDALUS 20, 20, 26 (2010). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 26-27 (“What we appear to observe, then, is a mutually reinforcing 
social process: disadvantage and crime work together to drive up the incarceration rate. 
This combined influence in turn deepens the spatial concentration of disadvantage, even 
if at the same time it reduces crime through incapacitation.”); see also Cadora et al., 
supra note 86, at 288. 
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 and destroys social citizenship.
92
  On the issue of social 
citizenship, Roberts observes, “As these communities disengage from the 
national political economy, the rest of society stigmatizes them as 
criminal, deprives them of social supports, and treats their members as 
noncitizens.”93  One way that this theory has been effectively 
demonstrated is through a famous audit study
94
 conducted by Princeton 
Sociologist Devah Pager.  In Pager’s study, she compared job prospects 
of black and white men who were recently released from jail.  Her key 
 
 90. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 1282 (“Damage to social networks starts at the 
family level and reverberates throughout communities where the families of prisoners are 
congregated.  Locking up someone places an immediate financial and social strain on the 
rest of the family, and the burden falls primarily on the shoulders of women caregivers, 
who customarily shore up families experiencing extreme hardship.”).  However, it is 
important to recognize that, while criminal justice policies have impacted African 
American men to great effect, the fastest growing class of prisoners over the last 
generation are actually women, whose numbers have risen over 757% between 1977 and 
2004.  See NATASHA A. FROST ET AL., INST. ON WOMEN & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, HARD HIT: 
THE GROWTH IN THE IMPRISONMENT OF WOMEN, 1977-2004, at 7 (2006), available at 
http://bit.ly/TGDB4u; see also US: World’s Leading Jailer, New Numbers Show, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (December 11, 2008), http://bit.ly/VojC19 (black females are incarcerated at 
approximately three times the rate of white females and twice that of Hispanic females).  
The ramifications of incarceration in this instance are even greater, as women tend to be 
primary caretakers of children and others, and results in an even more direct dislocation.  
See FROST, supra note 90, at 8; see also Women in the Justice System, THE SENTENCING 
PROJ., http://bit.ly/mUtaI8 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“The number of women in prison, 
a third of whom are incarcerated for drug offenses, is increasing at nearly double the rate 
for men.  These women often have significant histories of physical and sexual abuse, high 
rates of HIV infection, and substance abuse. Large-scale women’s imprisonment has 
resulted in an increasing number of children who suffer from their mother’s incarceration 
and the loss of family ties.”). 
 91. Roberts, supra note 3, at 1285 (“By straining social networks, mass incarceration 
also affects communities’ social norms.  Drawing upon social disorganization theory, 
researchers have shown that weakening infrastructure threatens a community’s 
foundation of informal social control.  Disorganized communities cannot enforce social 
norms because it is too difficult to reach consensus on common values and on avenues 
for solving common problems.  Because informal social controls play a greater role in 
public safety than do formal state controls, this breakdown can seriously jeopardize 
community safety.”). 
 92. See id. at 1291 (“Mass incarceration dramatically constrains the participation of 
African American communities in the mainstream political economy . . . through 
‘invisible punishments’ . . . felon disenfranchisement . . . labor market exclusion . . . 
[and] civic isolation.”); see also Mitchell, supra note 3, at 835 (“[Felon exclusion] laws 
also diminish the collective citizenship of many African-American communities.”). 
 93. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 1295. 
 94. An audit study creates an artificial pool of people among whom there are no 
average differences by race.  In this study, groups of white and black auditors are 
matched on every category other than their race, trained to act in identical ways with 
identical resumes, and are sent to interview for the same jobs.  Comparisons can yield 
strong evidence of discrimination.  See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 
108 AM. J. OF SOC. 937 (2003). 
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finding was that blacks were significantly discriminated against when 
applying for service jobs.
95
  Moreover, whites with a criminal record had 
about the same prospect of getting an interview as blacks without one.
96
  
One can reasonably argue that simply being African American is 
strongly correlated with incarceration in the public imagination and 
occurs through a pattern of mutual reinforcement.  Consequently, for 
many low-income African Americans, incarceration creates not just 
shadow citizens in an individual sense but shadow communities as well. 
2. Class Matters 
People of color, especially African Americans, tend to be 
overrepresented among the poor.  This racialized economic divide is 
growing.
97
  However, as race is surely a predicative factor of poverty as 
well as of mass imprisonment, we must interrogate the question of class.  
Statistical data on economic status for prisoners is difficult to obtain.
98
  
Nevertheless, more than 80 percent of prisoners qualify for indigent legal 
services, and this fact is a strong indication that, generally speaking, the 
poor are disproportionately represented among people in the criminal 
justice system.
99
  But accounting for poverty as a co-recurring factor in 
incarceration is complicated because the meanings associated with class 
are myriad and do not necessarily illuminate the complexities arising 
from the intersection of race and class within the criminal justice system.  
 
 95. Id. at 937-58. 
 96. Id. at 937, 958 (“The findings of this study reveal an important, and much under-
recognized, mechanism of stratification.  A criminal record presents a major barrier to 
employment, with important implications for racial disparities.”). 
 97. See Disturbing Racial Wealth Gap, ECON. POLICY INST., http://bit.ly/TGGfHq 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“Wealth for the median black household has all but vanished, 
decreasing by more than 65[%] from $6,300 in 1983 to $2,200 in 2009. . . .  [W]hile 
median wealth has fallen substantially among both white and black households since 
2007, at $97,900, white median wealth remains higher than the 1983 level of $94,100.  
White median wealth is now 44.5 times higher than black median wealth.”); see also 
Amanda Logan & Tim Westrich, The State of Minorities: How are Minorities Fairing in 
the Economy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 29, 2008), http://bit.ly/RatBTX (“African 
Americans’ median income declined by an average of 1.3[%] per year from 2000 to 
2006, after having risen by an average of 2.2[%] per year in the 1990s. . . .  In 2006, 
whites’ median income was $52,423, which is 1.6 times greater than African Americans’ 
median income in that year.”). 
 98. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31 
(2011) (arguing that there is virtually no data on the economic profiles of defendants and 
that the states and federal government should collect that data to ascertain whether laws 
target poor people). 
 99. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, RE-ENTRY AND REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO PUBLIC 
SAFETY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2006), available at http://bit.ly/RepUef; see 
also Indigent Defense Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
http://bit.ly/RRvGEP (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
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While audit studies like Pager’s Mark of a Criminal Record100 
demonstrate how criminality is associated with race in the employment 
context, less is known about how class status specifically keeps one tied 
to criminality, or at least how one’s class status engenders resistance to 
escaping criminal identity. 
Legal scholars argue that class is under-theorized in the modern era, 
especially as compared to race.
101
  Americans tend to think of class as an 
economic location rather than as an identity because class status appears 
to be fluid with respect to income and access to upward mobility.
102
  
However, as cautioned by legal scholar Trina Jones, it is important not to 
equate income with class.  “[A]lthough people tend to fixate on income, 
income is not the only indicator of class.  Wealth, educational 
background, occupational skill and status, consumption patterns and 
practices, and residential location, among other things, are also used to 
assign class.”103  This insight is particularly relevant because these other 
features of class, when they indicate poverty status, are already 
correlated with incarceration.  That is, prisoners tend to be poor, 
underemployed, uneducated, and from disadvantaged neighborhoods; 
these conditions are all associated with criminal activity and 
incarceration.
104
  Moreover, a prisoner’s status, and by implication his or 
her class mobility, is even more diminished after a felony conviction.  As 
the following sections demonstrate, legal obstacles arising from criminal 
convictions keep felons in a cycle of poverty and thus act as a drag on 
class status that have onerous implications for the resumption of social 
citizenship.  Low-income status indicates a reinforced ineffectiveness in 
navigating the terms of incarceration and subsequent social and political 
reintegration. 
B. Civil Collateral Consequences 
Disenfranchisement is not part of an offender’s sentence and is 
therefore a “collateral” consequence of a felony conviction.105  In fact, 
because this particular sanction is not levied during sentencing in the 
 
 100. See Pager, supra note 94. 
 101. Trina Jones, Foreword to Race and Socioeconomic Class: Examining an 
Increasingly Complex Tapestry, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, v (2009). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. According to a 1997 survey of state prisoners conducted by the U.S. Department 
of Justice, three-fourths of state inmates did not complete high school, almost one-half 
reported incomes of less than $1,000 in the month before arrest, and two-fifths were 
either unemployed or working only part-time before their arrest.  CAROLINE WOLF 
HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONS POPULATIONS (2003), 
available at http://1.usa.gov/uHQMoq. 
 105. See generally Mass Imprisonment, supra note 41, at 50. 
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same way as incarceration, fines, and probation,
106
 disenfranchisement 
resulting from a criminal conviction is not considered punishment at 
all.
107
  Rather, all non-criminal sanctions are deemed civil disabilities,
108
 
which have been automatically triggered by the state as a consequence of 
the conviction.  Nevertheless, scholars have noted that “virtually every 
felony conviction carries with it a life sentence”109 through the effects of 
civil collateral consequences such as disenfranchisement, which continue 
to punish long after the criminal sentence is served.  In Mauer and 
Chesney-Lind’s influential volume, Invisible Punishment: The Collateral 
Consequences of Mass Imprisonment,
110
 author Jeremy Travis refers to 
disenfranchisement and other civil sanctions collectively as “invisible 
punishment,”111 in part because they operate hidden from public view, 
outside of the process of criminal sentencing.
112
  The effects are 
widespread, and voter disenfranchisement is not the only civil disability 
arising from criminal convictions.  Other civil collateral consequences 
include: significant limitations on employment, restrictions on 
occupational licenses, barriers to public and private housing, thwarted 
access to legal immigration, ineligibility for public benefits, limited 
access to educational loans, the inability to maintain parental rights or act 
 
 106. Incarceration is not always an inevitable result of a criminal conviction.  Plea 
agreements can often result in a period of probation.  It is important to note, however, 
that the civil disabilities still attach because the conviction itself is what triggers the 
sanction.  As Alexander points out, social exclusion depends on the felon label, not on 
prison time.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 92-94. 
 107. See Karlan, supra note 4, at 1150 (“One of the linchpins of current doctrine 
regarding criminal disenfranchisement statutes is the assumption that these laws are 
essentially regulatory, rather than punitive. . . .  The current conception so undercuts 
originally regulatory justifications for disenfranchising offenders that only penal 
justifications remain.  Thus, if felon disenfranchisement is to be justified, it must be 
justified as a permissible form of punishment.”). 
 108. See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in 
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 
15-16 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (“[P]unishment that is 
accomplished through the diminution of the rights and privileges of citizenship and legal 
residency in the United States. . . .  Through judicial interpretation, legislative fiat, and 
legal classification, these forms of punishment have been defined as ‘civil’ rather than 
criminal in nature, as ‘disabilities’ rather than punishments, as the ‘collateral 
consequences’ of criminal convictions rather than the direct results.”). 
 109. See Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of 
Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 527 (2006). 
 110. INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
 111. See Travis, supra note 108, at 16. 
 112. See id.  Over the same period that prisons and criminal justice supervision have 
significantly increased, so too have laws and regulations that serve to diminish the rights 
and privileges of defendants. 
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as a foster parent, qualifications for jury service,
113
 and child support 
enforcement for debt accrued during a period of incarceration.
114
  Thus, 
civil sanctions are not collateral at all in at least one important sense:  




As Travis points out, the lack of visibility surrounding the 
proliferation of these collateral consequences has another dimension: 
civil sanctions are not conceived of and developed in the same milieu as 
criminal legislative enactments.
116
  They are often added as riders to 
other pieces of legislation, not considered by judiciary committees, and 
not typically codified with other criminal sanctions.
117
  As a result, their 
effects are not openly debated to determine their efficacy in public 
policy.
118
  Yet, they have multiplied in tandem with “tough on crime” 
criminal sentencing throughout the country within federal statutes and 
the legislative schemes in every single state.
119
  Similarly, under the 
 
 113. See Collateral Consequences, THE SENTENCING PROJ., http://bit.ly/RLf5iV (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“Increasingly, laws and policies are being enacted to restrict 
persons with a felony conviction (particularly convictions for drug offenses) from 
employment, receipt of welfare benefits, access to public housing, and eligibility for 
student loans for higher education.  Such collateral penalties place substantial barriers to 
an individual’s social and economic advancement.”). 
 114. See Ann Cammett, Expanding Collateral Sanctions: The Hidden Costs of 
Aggressive Child Support Enforcement against Incarcerated Parents, 13 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 313, 315 (2006) (arguing that child support debt incurred by 
incarcerated obligors is yet another collateral consequence of criminal conviction, which 
serves as a barrier to successful reentry). 
 115. See id. at 314. 
 116. See Travis, supra note 108, at 16-17. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at 17 (“[Collateral consequences] should be openly included in our 
debates over punishment policy, incorporated in our sentencing jurisprudence, and 
subjected to rigorous research and evaluation.”).  It should also be noted that perpetuating 
civil roadblocks has an impact on the ability of ex-felons to manage effective reentry 
after they have “paid their debt to society” and runs counter to the goal of encouraging 
them to live crime-free lives after release. 
 119. In 2003, the American Bar Association promulgated a new chapter of its 
Criminal Justice Standards that called on each U.S. jurisdiction to collect and analyze the 
collateral consequences in its laws and regulations.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA 
STANDARDS FOR COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF 
CONVICTED PERSONS § 19-2.1 (2003).  The ABA Standards identified two types of 
collateral consequences: (1) “collateral sanctions,” defined as penalties imposed 
automatically upon conviction, and (2) “discretionary disqualifications,” defined as 
penalties that are authorized but not required to be imposed.  Id.  This distinction between 
automatic and discretionary collateral consequences was carried forward into a uniform 
law presently under consideration by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws and, more recently, into Section 510 of the Court Security Act, both 
of which also call for a comprehensive inventory and study of collateral consequences.  
See AM. BAR ASS’N, INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN 
FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 9 (2009). 
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American system of federalism, the application of sanctions is not 
uniform because states have each developed their own sanctioning 
priorities.  The effect on any given individual depends on the jurisdiction 
in which he or she resides, as well as whether the conviction occurred 
previously in another state with different penalties.
120
  Consequently, a 
working knowledge of collateral consequences is beyond the expertise of 
most criminal defense attorneys,
121
 even when they are inclined to 
counsel defendants in this regard.  Moreover, as a rule, courts do not 
require attorneys to inform clients entering into plea agreements of these 
sanctions.
122
  Accordingly, people with criminal convictions are often 
surprised when they encounter these roadblocks after release and are left 
to fend for themselves in navigating them.  And there are plenty of 
people confronting civil barricades:  more than 700,000 people are 
released from prison each year,
123
 and this number does not account for 
people disabled by felony convictions who received probation in lieu of 
incarceration. 
This contradiction sheds light on an important but oft-ignored 
feature of collateral consequences that relates to the perpetuation of 
diminished class status.  Civil barriers that result from criminal 
convictions, in most instances, only target the poor.
124
  Although it seems 
unimaginable that facially neutral regulations are actually designed to 
discriminate against the poor, a cursory examination of its differential 
effects demonstrates that this is so, largely because these regulations 
 
 120. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY (2004), 
available at http://bit.ly/eN80np (a 50-state survey of laws affecting reentry); see also 
Archer & Williams, supra note 109, at 546, 547 (“To dismantle this crippling web of 
collateral sanctions, advocates must engage in a comprehensive, citizenship-freeing 
litigation attack on reentry barriers. . . .  [T]he most effective form of attack is state-by-
state impact litigation, particularly in vulnerable states: those with extensive, challenge-
worthy mazes of collateral sanctions and constitutional and statutory provisions.”). 
 121. See Travis, supra note 108, at 17 (“Little wonder, then, that defense lawyers 
cannot easily advise their clients of all of the penalties that will flow from a plea of 
guilty.”). 
 122. Courts have generally not required attorneys to inform defendants about civil 
collateral consequences.  The one exception to this rule is Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1473 (2010), concluding that an attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel when 
the attorney failed to counsel his non-citizen client on the consequences of a plea 
agreement resulting in deportation. 
 123. WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2008, at 
4 (2009), available at http://1.usa.gov/QGFjlE (showing that 735,454 prisoners were 
released from state and federal prisons in 2008). 
 124. See Cammett, supra note 114, at 319 (“One aspect of these civil disabilities 
should be of particular interest to anti-poverty advocates. Collateral sanctions, 
particularly against people with drug convictions, affect poor people almost 
exclusively . . . sanctions themselves deprive formerly incarcerated people of 
opportunities to lift themselves out of poverty. . . .”). 
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target income supports used by low-income people.
125
  For example, an 
ex-offender may be banned from living with a family member in public 
housing, denied eligibility for federal welfare and food stamp benefits, 
subjected to limits on financial aid for higher education, and faced with 
far reaching restrictions on employment opportunities.
126
  Because 
prisoners tend to have fewer social networks to rely upon,
127
 these broad 
restrictions on low-wage employment and occupational licenses tend to 
have more of a direct effect.
128
 
The pernicious effects of collateral consequences are now becoming 
known.
129
  The American Bar Association has released a database 
identifying more than 38,000 punitive provisions that currently affect 
people convicted of crimes.
130
  Travis observed in 2002 that these 
punishments serve as “instruments of ‘social exclusion,’” creating a 
“permanent diminution in social status of convicted offenders, a 
distancing between ‘us’ and ‘them.’”131  The “perpetual marginality”132 
 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Archer & Williams, supra note 109, at 530. 
 127. See Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender 
Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 259 (2004) (“The ex-offender population has tended to 
recidivate due in part to an unavailability of economic and social supports.”). 
 128. See id.  Archer and Williams also make the point that drug offenders bear a 
disproportionate burden of collateral consequences and that “such barriers have created 
an absurd result: ex-offenders convicted of rape or murder are nonetheless eligible for a 
number of rights denied to drug offenders.”  See Archer & Williams, supra note 109, at 
530. 
 129. Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting 
Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 461 (2010) (“[T]he problem of 
postconviction collateral consequences is rapidly becoming more severe for three 
interrelated reasons.  First, collateral consequences have increased in number, scope, and 
severity since the 1980s.  Second, record numbers of individuals are now exiting U.S. 
correctional facilities.  Finally, collateral consequences hinder reentry and exacerbate the 
risks of recidivism; in fact, most individuals will be rearrested within three years of 
release.”). 
 130. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Op-Ed., Paying a Price, Long after the 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, available at http://nyti.ms/RggT3H (noting that even 
arrests that did not result in conviction can be used to deny employment).  “The impact of 
these arrests is felt for years.  The ubiquity of criminal-background checks and the 
efficiency of information technology in maintaining those records and making them 
widely available, have meant that millions of Americans—even those who served 
probation or parole but were never incarcerated—continue to pay a price long after the 
crime.”  Id. 
 131. See Travis, supra note 108, at 19; see also Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their 
Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 753 (2011) (“[T]he goal of the justice system must be 
the full and early reintegration of a convicted person into free society—with the same 
benefits and opportunities available to any other member of the general public—free of 
unreasonable status-generated penalties and the stigma of conviction.”).  Love describes 
relief provisions in the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act (UCCCA) 
that provides some restoration of legal rights and social status.  See id. at 784-88. 
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C. The Mysteries of Re-enfranchisement 
Political disenfranchisement must be examined in tandem with co-
occurring civil sanctions that isolate felons from the economic fabric of 
society by burdening them with unseen and inscrutable barriers to life’s 
necessities.
134
  This aggregate harm affects ex-felons’ ability to navigate 
reentry and masks the larger problem of economic marginalization that 
characterizes the lives of prisoners, who are disproportionately poor to 
begin with.
135
  Nevertheless, the liberalization of disenfranchisement law 
has also led to more states allowing for restoration procedures for voting 
rights.  The legal corollary to disenfranchisement is re-enfranchisement, 
a process of reclaiming franchise rights where the law permits.  
However, there is widespread confusion about state re-enfranchisement 
processes, which occur in an overwhelming maze of regulations.
136
  State 
laws vary widely on when and how voting rights may be restored.
137
  For 
instance, Maine and Vermont do not deny prisoners the right to vote, but 
Kentucky, Virginia, Iowa, and Florida permanently disenfranchise all 
felons.
138
  The 44 remaining states maintain a patchwork of laws that 
vary significantly:  some states restore voting rights upon release from 
prison, others upon completion of probation and parole, and others 
 
 132. See, e.g., Loïc Wacquant, The New ‘Peculiar Institution’: On the Prison as 
Surrogate Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL CRIM. 377, 384 (2000) (“a closed circuit of perpetual 
marginality”). 
 133. See Pinard, supra note 129, at 457 (“[D]ecisionmakers in the United States failed 
to foresee the collective impact of these consequences when they expanded them 
dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s.  They also failed to account for the disproportionate 
impact these consequences would have on individuals and communities of color.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 127, at 258 (“[A]n overwhelming number of ex-
offenders entered prison with disabilities that continue to plague them upon reentry into 
their communities.  A prison record, in addition to minimal education and a lack of job 
skills, limits ex-offenders’ employability in many cases.”). 
 135. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 100-01 (2006) 
(noting that about a third of inmates were not working before being admitted to prison or 
jail based on correctional surveys between 1979 and 1997).  “[U]nderscoring their low 
levels of ability and poor employment records, prison and jail inmates earn significantly 
less at the time of their incarceration than other young men aged twenty-two to thirty 
with the same level of education.”  Id.; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 84 
(“Approximately 80% of criminal defendants are indigent and thus unable to hire a 
lawyer.”). 
 136. See Ewald, supra note 32, at 1054. 
 137. ERIKA WOOD & RACHEL BLOOM, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. & ACLU., DE FACTO 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 1 (2008). 
 138. See id.  Disenfranchisement is permanent unless they receive “individual, 
discretionary clemency” from the governors of those states.  See also PORTER, supra note 
2. 
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Adding to the confusion, state re-enfranchisement laws constantly 
change.  In 2007, the state of Florida amended its voting restoration 
procedure to approve automatically the reinstatement of rights for many 
persons convicted of non-violent offenses.
140
  The amended restoration 
procedure was rescinded in 2011 by Florida Governor Rick Scott, along 
with three other elected officials, all acting as the state’s executive 
clemency board.  “Under the new . . . rules, even nonviolent offenders 
would have to wait five years after the conclusion of their sentences to 
apply for the chance to have their civil rights restored.”141  The new 
policy was drafted by state Attorney General Pam Bondi, who asserted 
that the rule would be “fair and restore a proper respect for the rights of 
law-abiding citizens.”142  She further claimed that “felons deserved their 
rights only after they have demonstrated a commitment to living a crime-
free life.”143  Although a race-neutral rationale for the change was 
asserted, the racial impact could not be clearer:  more than 100,000 
felons who had completed their sentences, largely African American, 
were able to register before the 2008 elections.
144
  Today, however, 
released felons in Florida are forced to apply—and in many cases wait 
years—for a clemency board hearing for a chance to have their voting 
rights restored or obtain occupational licenses.
145
  Currently, more than 




Re-enfranchisement, as a legal matter, is further complicated by the 
fact that, even in states where resumption of voting rights is possible, a 
national trend of de facto disenfranchisement
147
 occurs through a deficit 
of competent administration regarding restoration processes.
148
  For 
example, research shows that many “election officials do not understand 
the basic voter eligibility rules governing people with criminal 
convictions,” nor do they understand the “basic registration procedures 
for people with criminal convictions.”149  Although eligibility and 
 
 139. See WOOD & BLOOM, supra note 137, at 1. 
 140. See FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS, supra note 2. 
 141. See Peter Wallsten, Fla. Republicans Make it Harder for Ex-Felons to Vote, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2011, available at http://wapo.st/fQnz5F. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See WOOD & BLOOM, supra note 137, at 1. 
 148. See id. at 2. 
 149. See id. 
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registration laws vary, some root causes have been identified for de facto 
disenfranchisement.
150
  Further, “administering these laws requires 
election officials to be experts in the criminal justice system”;151 
conversely, “informing individuals of their rights requires criminal 
justice officials to be experts in voting laws.”152  Yet, few educational 
materials explaining these laws are available, and “there is a severe lack 
of communication between criminal justice agencies and election 
officials.”153  De facto disenfranchisement can also arise from ignorance 
among prisoners themselves, who often have no idea that they can vote 
in their state or how to engage the process.
154
  Relatively few ex-felons 
take the necessary steps, which range from administrative procedures to 
a full pardon, to regain the right to vote.
155
  Consequently, hundreds of 
thousands may not be able to vote, even though they are entitled to do so 
under the law.
156
  Failure to register operates at a psychological level as 
well.  As Michelle Alexander points out, “Even those who knew they 
were eligible to register worried that registering to vote would somehow 
attract attention to them—perhaps land them back in jail.”157  Although 
this idea may seem paranoid at first glance, Alexander points out that 
“many Southern blacks have vivid memories of the harsh consequences 
that befell their parents and grandparents who attempted to vote in 
defiance of poll taxes, literacy tests and other devices adopted to 
suppress the black vote.”158 
While re-enfranchisement law, in all its iterations, presents 
obstacles to the legal resumption of rights, it does not occur in a vacuum.  
 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. at 8. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See WOOD & BLOOM, supra note 137, at 9. 
 154. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 154 (“Even those former prisoners who are 
technically eligible to vote frequently remain disenfranchised for life.”); see also WOOD 
& BLOOM, supra note 137, at 1 (“Without further public education or outreach, the citizen 
will mistakenly believe that he is ineligible to vote for years, decades, or maybe the rest 
of his life.  And that same citizen may pass along that same inaccurate information to his 
peers, family members and neighbors, creating a lasting ripple of de facto 
disenfranchisement across his community.”). 
 155. See Ewald, supra note 32, at 1056-57 (“Each . . . state establishes some 
procedure by which ex-convicts may petition to regain the right to vote, but restoration 
procedures often make regaining the vote ‘extremely difficult,’ in some cases purposely 
so.”); see also WOOD & BLOOM, supra note 137, at 1 (“Once a single local election 
official misinforms a citizen that he is not eligible to vote because of a past conviction, it 
is unlikely that citizen will ever follow up or make a second inquiry.”). 
 156. WOOD & BLOOM, supra note 137, at 8 (“Potentially hundreds of thousands of 
eligible voters may be denied their right to vote.”). 
 157. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 155. 
 158. See id. at 155-56 (probing this fear more deeply, Alexander goes on to note that 
“[t]oday, ex-offenders live in constant fear of a different form of racial oppression—
racial profiling, police brutality, and revocation of parole.”). 
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Regaining the right to vote is contextual and tied to factors outside of and 
beyond the legal re-enfranchisement regulatory scheme.  Such critical 
factors include debt, which has become an increasingly critical barrier to 
social citizenship. 
D. The Emergence of Carceral Debt 
Carceral debt is debt that is associated with or incurred pursuant to 
criminalization.  This type of debt can be viewed as consisting of two 
distinct variants, both stemming from involvement with the justice 
system.  The first variant includes criminal financial penalties, such as 
restitution, court costs, and other fees that are directly associated with 
criminal convictions;
159
 the second variant, which includes lingering debt 
accumulated during or as a result of incarceration, often acts as a 
gateway to re-incarceration.
160
  Finally, child support debt, which is 
routinely accrued during incarceration, presents difficult challenges for 
reentry and family reunification.
161
 
1. Criminal Justice Debt 
Criminal justice-related debts are levied on offenders in three 
primary ways:  (1) fines levied to punish the offender, (2) penalties 
levied for restitution to victims, and (3) assessments with the goal of 
public cost-recovery.
162
  Fines are formal penalties imposed on people 
convicted of crimes by the court as part of the judgment and sentence.  
They are typically a monetary penalty and are usually imposed as 
 
 159. See generally Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison: 
Prisoners’ Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. OF 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 187 (2007) (focusing on the accumulation of debt during a prison 
stay, the authors note that such policies are ill-advised and undermine the criminal justice 
system’s rehabilitation goals, the child support system’s goals to support children, and 
society’s interest in fully reintegrating people after release from prison); see also ALICIA 
BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO 
REENTRY 4 (2010) (examining practices in the 15 states with the highest prison 
populations, which together account for more than 60 percent of all state criminal filings 
and focuses primarily on the proliferation of “user fees,” financial obligations imposed 
not for any traditional criminal justice purpose such as punishment, deterrence, or 
rehabilitation but rather to fund tight state budgets). 
 160. Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 159, at 187. 
 161. See REBECCA MAY & MARGUERITE ROULET, CTR. FOR FAMILY POL’Y & 
PRACTICE, A LOOK AT ARRESTS OF LOW-INCOME FATHERS FOR CHILD SUPPORT 
NONPAYMENT 6 (2005) (“One of the issues of particular concern to low-income 
noncustodial [parents] is the relationship between child support enforcement and 
incarceration, and the effect of both on their lives and their families.  There are distinct 
ways in which child support enforcement and incarceration are linked . . . there has been 
an increasing effort by states to criminalize the nonpayment of support (both as 
misdemeanors and as felonies).”). 
 162. Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 159, at 188. 
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punishment based on the severity of the crime.
163
  Restitution is court 
ordered payment by the offender directly to the victim to compensate for 
financial losses.
164
  The cost of restitution is levied at sentencing but can 
be collected during a period of probation or parole.
165
  Finally, public 
cost-recovery fees reflect the efforts of states to pass the costs of criminal 
justice and other state deficits onto prisoners.
166
  These “user fees” differ 
greatly from other kinds of court-imposed legal financial obligations 
(LFOs).
167
  “Unlike fines, whose purpose is to punish, and restitution, 
whose purpose is to compensate victims, user fees are explicitly intended 
to raise revenue” for state coffers.168  A report from the Brennan Center 
for Justice indicates that “[c]ash-strapped states have increasingly turned 
to user fees to fund their criminal justice systems, as well as to provide 
general budgetary support.”169  States now charge defendants for 
everything from probation supervision, to jail stays, to the use of a 
constitutionally-required public defender.”170  These surcharges are 
 
 163. See id. (“According to researchers, nationally, fines are imposed in 25% of all 
felony convictions: 20% of violent offenses, 24% of property offenses, 27% of drug 
offenses, 19% of weapons offenses, and 27% of other offenses.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 164. See id. at 188-89 (“Restoration is rooted in a restorative justice approach that 
emphasizes repairing the harm of criminal behavior.  It embodies both the just deserts 
notion of offense-based penalties and concern for the victim.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 165. See id. at 189. 
 166. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 159 (“What emerges is a disturbing uptick in 
both the dollar amount and the number of criminal justice fees imposed on offenders, as 
well as increased pressure on officials to collect fees, fines, and other forms of criminal 
justice debt.  The result is a broad array of collateral consequences that policy makers 
have seldom considered in the rush to raise revenue.”). 
 167. See Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 159, at 189 (“Increasingly courts also are 
imposing costs against convicted persons to cover basic court expenses, such as 
maintenance of court facilities, service of warrants, and law enforcement officers’ 
retirement funds.”). 
 168. BANNON ET AL., supra note 159, at 4 (“Sometimes deployed as an eleventh hour 
maneuver to close a state budget gap, the decision to raise or create new user fees is 
rarely made with much deliberation or thought about the consequences.”). 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id.; see also Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal 
Defendants Pay for Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and 
Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 323 (2009) (“The practice of ordering 
recoupment or contribution . . . of public defender attorney’s fees is widespread, although 
collection rates are unsurprisingly low . . . not only is recoupment not cost-effective, but 
it too easily becomes an aspect of punishment, rather than legitimate cost-recovery.  In a 
number of jurisdictions, defendants are ordered to repay the cost of their attorney 
regardless of their ability to pay and without any notice or opportunity to be heard.  Many 
are ordered to pay as a condition of probation or parole, which means they pay under 
threat of incarceration.”). 
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imposed at every stage of the criminal justice system;
171
 and, while 
perhaps inconsequential individually, they create large debt loads in the 
aggregate.
172
  Because prisoners are typically poor and chronically 
underemployed, they are the class of people least able to afford these 
costs after release,
173
 especially after incarceration has rendered them less 
employable.
174
  Moreover, once these fees are levied, those who are 
unable to pay them are subject to the additional costs of recoupment in 
the form of interest, late fees, payment plan fees, and collection fees.
175
  
Despite the dramatic increase in the number of criminal justice fees, none 
of the states studied by the Brennan Center
176
 maintained any process 
whatsoever for tracking or measuring the cost-effectiveness or impact of 
criminal justice debt and related collection practices on former offenders, 
their families, or their communities.
177
  In the end, criminal justice-
 
 171. See Anderson, supra note 170, at 372-73.  Costs include:  pre-conviction fees, 
such as an application fee to obtain public defender and jail fee for pretrial incarceration; 
sentencing fees like those for court administrative costs; fees for designated funds (e.g., 
libraries, prison construction, etc.); public defender reimbursement; prosecution 
reimbursement; fees for the cost of incarceration in prison or jail; and the costs of 
probation, parole, or other supervision fees; drug testing; vehicle interlock device fees 
(DUIs); mandatory treatment, therapy, and class fees. 
 172. See ALAN ROSENTHAL & MARSHA WEISSMAN, CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS., 
SENTENCING FOR DOLLARS: THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 
17 (2007), available at http://bit.ly/XE6Jxy (detailing how these small amounts can 
potentially add up to big debt).  The report analyzed the financial consequences of two 
common felony convictions and found that someone convicted in New York in 2007 of 
driving while intoxicated (a felony) and operating a motor vehicle with no insurance (a 
misdemeanor) could end up facing a bill of almost $7,670.00 upon leaving the system.  
Id. 
 173. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 159, at 4 (“Employment rates for those coming 
out of prison are also notoriously low—up to 60 percent of former inmates are 
unemployed one year after release.”). 
 174. See WESTERN, supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 175. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 159, at 5. 
 176. See id. at 4.  The Brennan Center report discusses the national landscape of 
criminal justice debt and collection practices by surveying the 15 states with the largest 
prison populations.  According to the report, “Individuals incarcerated in these fifteen 
states represent 69 percent of all state prisoners nationally, and these states together have 
more than 60 percent of all state criminal filings.”  Id. 
 177. See id. at 5 (“When states impose debt that cannot be paid they are charting a 
path back to prison . . . [s]uspended driver’s licenses lead to criminal sanctions if debtors 
continue to drive.  Aggressive collection tactics can disrupt employment, make it difficult 
to meet other obligations such as child support, and lead to financial insecurity—all of 
which can lead to recidivism.”); see also Tina Rosenberg, Op-Ed., Paying for Their 
Crimes Again, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://nyti.ms/T4ScWD (“State 
legislatures that impose fees calculate how much money they bring in, but seldom look at 
the costs of collecting them.  It is high enough so that the fees often end up costing the 
state more than they produce.  They take up the time of probation and parole officers. 
Numerous collection-associated court dates burden the courts.  Most important, these fees 
increase the chance that people will end up back behind bars—either for failure to pay, or 
because the need to find a lot of money right away pushes people back into crime.”). 
  
2012] SHADOW CITIZENS 381 
related debt has the effect of turning prisoners into perpetual debtors, 
which has obvious implications for successful reentry, and less obvious 
implications for leaving prison at all.
178
 
2. Debt Accumulation and Incarceration 
It might come as a surprise to many to discover that debtors’ prison 
still exists.  Historically, every U.S. colony, and later every state, 
permitted imprisonment for debt.
179
  Individual states began to repeal 
these laws in the nineteenth century.
180
  Incarceration of civil debtors was 
later abolished under federal law as well.
181
  However, debtors’ prison 
has persisted in other ways and, like mass incarceration, is based on race 
and class status.  After the Civil War, many Southern states used criminal 
justice debt collection “as a means of effectively re-enslaving African 
Americans, allowing landowners and companies to ‘lease’ black convicts 
by paying off criminal justice debt that they were too poor to pay on their 
own.”182  Today, despite contrary Supreme Court precedent constraining 
a state’s ability to incarcerate poor obligors183 and constitutional 
provisions explicitly forbidding imprisonment for civil debts in most 
states,
184
 de facto debtors’ prisons persist.185  “Imprisonment for failure 
 
 178. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 159, at 5 (“Against this backdrop, criminal 
justice debt adds yet one more barrier to getting on one’s feet.  What at first glance 
appears to be easy money for the state can carry significant hidden costs—both human 
and financial—for individuals, for the government, and for the community at large . . . 
[i]t is time to reconsider the wisdom of turning persons with criminal convictions into 
debtors . . . the hidden costs of imposing and collecting user fees and other forms of 
criminal justice debt are profound.”); see also Rosenberg, supra note 177 (“We know that 
states rarely offer former prisoners the help they need to change their lives, such as drug 
treatment, job search help, stable housing or schooling.  What’s less widely known is that 
all over the country, states give newly released prisoners something that immediately 
sabotages their chances of going straight: a bill for hundreds or thousands of dollars in 
court costs that they must pay or risk going back to prison.”). 
 179. See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS 79 (2002) (“The only consistency 
among debt laws in the eighteenth century was that every colony, and later every state, 
permitted imprisonment for debt.”). 
 180. See Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor—and a Modest 
Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 814 (1983) (“A 
wave of reform in the 1830’s . . . led to state constitutional provisions forbidding 
imprisonment for debt. Today, such prohibitions appear in the constitutions of most states 
and in the statutes of several where the constitutions are silent.”). 
 181. See 28 U.S.C. § 2007 (2006) (“A person shall not be imprisoned for debt 
[through] process issued from a court of the United States in any State wherein 
imprisonment for debt has been abolished.”). 
 182. BANNON ET AL., supra note 159, at 19. 
 183. See infra Part IV.B. 
 184. See infra Part IV.B. 
 185. Ann K. Wagner, The Conflict Over Bearden v. Georgia in State Courts: Plea-
Bargained Probation Terms and the Specter of Debtors’ Prison, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
383, 384 (2010). 
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to pay a fine, restitution, or court costs can occur when repayment is 
made a condition of probation or parole and the defendant defaults.”186  
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has opined that incarceration can 
be used to collect criminal justice debt only when a person has the ability 
to make payments but refuses to do so.  In Bearden v. Georgia,
187
 the 
Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment bars courts from revoking 
probation for a failure to pay a fine without first inquiring into a person’s 
ability to pay and considering whether there are adequate alternatives to 
imprisonment.
188
  The Court noted, “[I]f the State determines a fine or 
restitution to be the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it 
may not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the 
resources to pay it.”189  However, the cautionary warning set forth by the 
Court has been largely ignored. 
According to a report by the American Civil Liberties Union,
190
 
“[C]ourts across the United States routinely disregard the protections and 
principles the Supreme Court established in Bearden,”191 noting that “[i]n 
the wake of the recent fiscal crisis, states and counties now collect legal 
debts more aggressively from men and women who have already served 
their criminal sentences, regardless of whether they demonstrate the 
ability to pay these debts.”192  States run afoul of the spirit, if not the 
 
 186. See id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-62 (2012) (“In cases of willful nonpayment 
of the fine and costs, the defendant shall either be imprisoned in the county jail or, at the 
discretion of the court, sentenced to hard labor for the county.”). 
 187. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
 188. See id. at 661-62 (“We conclude that the trial court erred in automatically 
revoking probation because petitioner could not pay his fine, without determining that 
petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative 
forms of punishment did not exist.”). 
 189. See id. at 667-68.  The Court was relying on its earlier decision in Williams v. 
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970) (holding that extending a maximum prison term 
because a person is too poor to pay fines or court costs violates the right to equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).  Nevertheless, the Court clarified, 
“[N]othing in our decision today precludes imprisonment for willful refusal to pay a fine 
or court costs.”  Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668 (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 242 n.19). 
 190. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW 
DEBTORS’ PRISONS (2010) [hereinafter DEBTORS’ PRISONS], available at 
http://bit.ly/9EQBMd. 
 191. See id. at 5; see also BANNON ET AL., supra note 159, at 20.  The report stated: 
[S]ome jurisdictions ignore the requirement that courts inquire into ability to 
pay before utilizing debtors’ prison, while many others skirt the edges of the 
law by failing to evaluate a defendant’s ability to pay until after he or she has 
been arrested, or even jailed, for criminal justice debt, or by allowing 
defendants to ‘volunteer’ to be incarcerated. 
Id. at 20. 
 192. DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 190, at 5.  The report shows how “indigent 
defendants are imprisoned for failing to pay legal debts they can never hope to manage.”  
Id.  “In many cases, poor men and women end up jailed or threatened with jail though 
they have no lawyer representing them.”  Id.  The ACLU contends that “[t]hese sentences 
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constitutional requirements, of Bearden in a variety of ways.
193
  Some 
states make criminal justice debt a condition of probation, parole, or 
other correctional supervision; when individuals fail to pay their debt, 
they may face re-arrest and may ultimately be sent to prison.
194
  Some 
“states have statutes or practices that authorize incarceration as a penalty 
for a willful failure to pay criminal justice debt, often under the guise of 
civil contempt.”195  Many jurisdictions “arrest people for failing to pay 
criminal justice debt or appear at debt-related hearings,” often leading 
“to multi-day jail terms pending an ability to pay hearing.”196  Finally, in 
several states, programs operate where defendants can request to spend 
time in jail as a way of paying down court-imposed debt.
197
  Programs 




Mounting debt from direct criminal justice costs is one type of debt 
accumulation.  States laud income from criminal justice fee revenues, but 
such a paradigm has the paradoxical result of engendering more 
incarceration because the poor are unable to pay, and the monetary costs 
of such punitive jailing is still ultimately borne by the state.
199
  A true 
cost-benefit analysis of user fees would reveal that costs imposed on 
sheriffs’ offices, local jails and prisons, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, and the courts themselves surpass what the states take in as 
revenue
200




are illegal, create hardships for men and women who already struggle with re-entering 
society after being released from prison or jail, and waste resources in an often fruitless 
effort to extract payments from defendants who may be homeless, unemployed, or simply 
too poor to pay.”  Id. 
 193. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 159, at 20. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See id. at 23.  For example, some jurisdictions allow people to “volunteer” to sit 
in jail as a way of fulfilling debt obligations.  Id.  In California, defendants can choose to 
sit out fines at a daily rate set by the county pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205(a).  Id. 
at 50 n.138.  In Missouri, the circuit judge has the power, at the request of a defendant, to 
commute fine and costs to imprisonment in the county jail, credited at $10 per day 
pursuant to MO. REV. STAT. § 543.270(1).  Id. at 50 n.139. 
 198. BANNON ET AL., supra note 159, at 20 (“[O]ther common collection practices, 
such as extending probation or suspending driver’s licenses, also lead to new offenses 
rooted in debt.”). 
 199. See RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 
REPAYING DEBTS 7 (2007), available at http://bit.ly/RLDV25 (“[A]n examination of 
court-ordered obligations in 11 states found an average of $178 million per state in 
uncollected court costs, fines, fees, and restitution. . . .  [Additionally,] administrators in 
one state report that only 23 percent of fines are successfully collected, and no action is 
taken on uncollected payments.”). 
 200. See id. 
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The reinforcing vortex of poverty, civil collateral consequences, and 
criminal justice debt should give us pause.  The ultimate cost of creating 
shadow citizens via these interlocking social conditions and ill-conceived 
policies could be the acceleration of a withering democracy as more 
people with fewer economic resources are denied voting. 
Nevertheless, there is another type of mounting debt accumulation 
by prisoners, not typically associated with incarceration, that in and of 
itself threatens to become a unique barrier to voter re-enfranchisement 
into the future:  child support debt. 
3. Child Support Arrears 
Child support debt is the bane of prisoners everywhere.
202
  Most 
people in prison are parents who have minor children to whom they owe 
a duty of support.
203
  Failing to support those children can result in 
contempt and, later, incarceration.  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided the case of Turner v. Rogers,
204
 holding that an indigent 
defendant does not have an automatic constitutional right to counsel in 
civil contempt cases that may result in imprisonment.  In Turner, which 
involved non-payment of child support as the basis of contempt, the 
majority required “procedural safeguards” to be put in place by the trial 
court to insure that the defendant’s incarceration would be predicated on 
a finding that his or her failure to pay was willful.
205
  Stated differently, 
the Court attempted to insure that low-income obligors were not 
incarcerated simply because they did not have the capacity to pay.  It is 
uncertain whether these safeguards required by the Supreme Court will 
be an adequate substitute for representation by counsel.  Nevertheless, 
Turner, and all of the media attention focused on the right to counsel in 
civil matters, has shed light on a practice that has been relegated to the 
 
 201. See id. at 2 (“[T]he ability of people to meet their court-imposed financial 
obligations immediately upon their return to the community from prisons and jails is 
typically unrealistic.”). 
 202. See Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POV. 
L. & POL’Y 127 (2011) (arguing that mass incarceration has radically skewed the “family 
wage” paradigm on which the child support system is based, removing millions of 
parents from the formal economy entirely, diminishing their income opportunities after 
release, and rendering them ineffective economic actors); see also Steve Yoder, 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, THE AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 14, 2011), http://bit.ly/Vp0Fvu (“[S]tates 
are looking to end policies that allow prisoners to accrue child-support debt while in 
prison and have most of their wages garnished when they get out—policies that drive 
many ex-prisoners to re-offend.”). 
 203. See MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 199, at 7. 
 204. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011). 
 205. See id. at 2520. 
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shadows: the routine criminalization
206
 of low-income child support 
obligors. 
Criminalization is multifaceted, as mounting debt from child 
support obligations also occurs as a result of incarceration for criminal 
offenses other than non-support.  For instance, debt from child support 
orders accrue because, in some states, a prisoners’ status as a felon 
precludes him or her from obtaining a modification based on reduced 
income while in prison.
207
  This policy prerogative is referred to as 
“voluntary unemployment,” a term of art in family law that dictates that 
a person’s reduced income through incarceration is self-caused through 
criminal acts.  Therefore, child support orders are not eligible for 
modification.  This policy, which is no longer embraced by all states,
208
 
reflects the perspective that a prisoner’s criminal acts should not warrant 
consideration when evaluating an obligation to provide for a child, 
notwithstanding the fact that child support orders are typically tied to 
parental income.
209
  States that embrace this policy use child support as a 
“proxy for further punishment.”210  Moreover, even in states that do not 
embrace an absolute ban on the reduction of existing child support 
orders, prisoners must still affirmatively petition a court to reduce their 
 
 206. As Turner indicates, failure to pay child support results in a risk of repeated 
incarceration.  See id. at 2509.  Every single jurisdiction in the United States has statutes 
criminalizing the willful or “knowing” failure to support children.  The criminal penalties 
often come in the guise of civil contempt statutes under which, as Turner now makes 
clear, incarceration may ensue.  These criminal penalties have expanded to encompass 
criminalization under federal law as well.  Armed with overwhelming bipartisan support 
for increasing punishment for delinquent obligors, President Clinton subsequently signed 
into law the “Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2006).  The Act 
made it a federal felony for any person to cross state lines for willful evasion of a child 
support obligation for a child in another state if the obligation is unpaid or is in an 
amount over $5,000.  Id.  The Act passed both chambers by overwhelming margins. 
 207. See Jessica Pearson, Building Debt While Doing Time: Child Support and 
Incarceration, 43 JUDGES J. 5, 6 (2004). 
 208. See Cammett, supra note 202, at 151-52.  The article stated: 
Other states articulate a different approach:  incarceration as a “complete 
justification” for suspending arrears, thus suggesting that child support orders 
should be tied to earning capacity, of which there is very little during 
incarceration.  Jurisdictions that follow this approach often note that, as a 
policy matter, forcing a prisoner to accumulate . . . insurmountable[] arrears 
during a period of incarceration acts as a disincentive to engaging the child 
support system and providing support and engagement with families after 
release.  Finally, a third evaluative method treats incarceration as “one factor” 
to be considered in determining whether a modification is warranted. 
Id.; see also Pearson, supra note 207, at 6. 
 209. Cammett, supra note 202, at 152 (“The diverging case law . . . on the question of 
state practices contributing to arrears . . . has a peculiar result.  Whether a prisoner 
amasses debt is often tied to what state in which he or she happens to be 
imprisoned. . . .”). 
 210. See id. at 130. 
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orders, or face debt that is unreviewable after it accrues under federal 
law.
211
  In any event, it is unlikely that the vast majority of incarcerated 
parents will know that they are prohibited by federal law from obtaining 
a reduction of debt that has accumulated during incarceration.
212
  Perhaps 
this is why, according to one study, “[p]arents in one state were shown to 
leave prison owing a[] [staggering] average of more than $20,000 in 
child support arrears.”213 
Low-income people are most likely to be ensnared by the state’s 
regulation of criminal justice debt because failure to satisfy these 
obligations often stems from a lack of resources rather than willful 
disregard.  Child support is a huge addendum to this debt problem.  
Policies continue to persist that lead to debt accumulation.
214
  These 
policies should give us pause because the children who are the intended 
beneficiaries will never receive financial support that was not actually 
earned during incarceration.
215
  Moreover, child support debt can become 
a formidable barrier to reentry through aggressive enforcement and, as 
the next section demonstrates, the resumption of social citizenship, 
including the right to vote. 
 
 211. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (2006).  The “Bradley” Amendment, named after 
former New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley, is a 1986 amendment to Title IV of the Social 
Security Act.  The practical effect of this Amendment is that child support awards 
become a judgment by operation of law, and courts are prohibited from reducing or 
eliminating a support order once it is issued, for any reason.  See Cammett, supra note 
202, at 130. 
 212. See Cammett, supra note 202, at 152 (“[P]risoners often have significant child 
support debt upon release, either because their state does not allow for modifications at 
all or because they are unaware that they must affirmatively petition for them under the 
notification requirement of the Bradley Amendment.”). 
 213. See MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 199, at 7.  The author can confirm, 
through anecdotal evidence and experience, that high arrears are the norm for prisoners 
across the country.  It is typical for an inmate with an existing child support order to leave 
prison with $30,000-$50,000 of arrears after just a few years of confinement. 
 214. See Cammett, supra note 202, at 129 (“Such a debt does not relate to real income 
since prisoners earn little or no money, the debt will likely never be collected, and the 
support arrearage will not ultimately redound to the benefit of their children.”). 
 215. See Esther Griswold & Jessica Pearson, Twelve Reasons for Collaboration 
Between Departments of Correction and Child Support Enforcement Agencies, 65 
CORRECTIONS TODAY 87, 88 (2003) (noting that inmates in Massachusetts may earn as 
little as $1 per day, and inmates in Colorado earn between 25¢ and $2.50 per day); see 
also Elizabeth J. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The 
Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 140 (2008).  The 
article stated: 
[T]he idea of child support orders and their vigorous enforcement as a means to 
a better life for the children of absent parents has sometimes gotten ahead of the 
reality.  Increasing the amount of a child support award provides no benefit to 
the child if there is no prospect of payment. 
Id. 
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III. FORMAL LEGAL BARRIERS AS BACK DOOR DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Thus far, this article has examined overlapping aspects of 
subordination, which creates informal but profound obstacles to an ex-
felon’s restoration of political citizenship through voting rights, as well 
as the pursuit of broader socio-economic citizenship and successful 
reintegration.  Part III explores the second aspect of this dual paradigm.  
An ex-felon who has the good fortune or social capital to transcend all of 
the informal boundaries set forth in the previous section
216
 must still 
contend with the formal legal barriers to re-enfranchisement arising from 
debt obligations.  While the number of states that erect formal legal 
barriers is small, it represents a potential trend that has been largely 
ignored.  Moreover, it provides a window into the various ways that debt 
and civil collateral consequences have become mutually and negatively 
reinforcing. 
A. Repayment of Fees, Fines, and Restitution 
In the last decade, states have embarked on a quiet but disturbing 
trajectory in the law of re-enfranchisement.  Appellate courts in the 
federal and state systems have upheld statutes that condition felon re-
enfranchisement on the full payment of restitution, court fees, or other 
debt.
217
  Ex-felons have the practical difficulty of navigating a maze of 
re-enfranchisement processes, but this problem can potentially be 
remedied by information and assistance.  However, ex-felons can also be 
stymied when they attempt to register to vote, only to discover that they 
are officially barred by statute until their substantial LFOs are satisfied.  
A number of states have enacted legislation that requires the payment of 
LFOs before regaining the right to vote.  In jurisdictions where there 
 
 216. As Michelle Alexander points out, “Once a person is labeled a felon, he or she is 
ushered into a parallel universe in which discrimination, stigma, and exclusion are 
perfectly legal, and privileges of citizenship such as voting and jury service are off-
limits.”  ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 92. 
 217. In addition to the states outlined in this article that have faced constitutional 
challenges conditioning re-enfranchisement on payment of LFOs, three states have 
enacted such legislation with no legal challenges to date.  See ALA. CODE § 15-22-
36.1(a), (g) (2012) (stating that a person convicted of a crime who applies for certificate 
of eligibility to register to vote must pay all fines, court costs, fees, and victim restitution; 
persons convicted of certain crimes are not eligible to apply for certificate of eligibility to 
register to vote); ARK. CONST. amend. 51, § 11(d)(2)(A) (noting that a felon who wants to 
register to vote must provide proof that he or she “has been discharged from probation or 
parole, has paid all probation or parole fees, or has satisfied all terms of imprisonment, 
and paid all applicable court costs, fines, or restitution.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.045 
(2012) (stating that all restitution must be paid and no outstanding warrants, charges, or 
indictments for felony offenders to restore their civil rights). 
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have been constitutional challenges, courts have given their imprimatur 
to these types of statutes. 
In 2000, the Fourth Circuit foreshadowed judicial assent to statutes 
conditioning voting rights on payment by upholding Virginia’s practice 
of requiring convicted felons to pay a $10 fee to begin the process of 
having civil rights fully restored.
218
  In an unpublished opinion, the court 
dismissed pro se appellant William Howard’s claim that requiring 
payment to start the process to restore the right to vote was an 
unconstitutional poll tax in violation of the Twenty-fourth 
Amendment.
219
  While the court agreed that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections
220
 precluded 
conditioning the right to vote upon payment of a fee,
221
 the court 
distinguished the appellant’s claim by asserting that “it is not his right to 
vote upon which payment of the fee is being conditioned; rather, it is the 
restoration of his civil rights upon which the payment of a fee is being 
conditioned.”222  This may be a distinction without a difference for Mr. 
Howard, who sought to exercise the important right to vote by 
challenging the process of re-enfranchisement in his state.  Nevertheless, 
this case foreshadowed a standard approach to addressing the dilemma of 
wealth based conditions on voting:  that courts would embrace a 
jurisprudence which foregoes the rigorous analysis applied to the 
constitutionally protected right to vote in favor of the less probing 
scrutiny accorded a state’s civil restoration statute.223 
 
 218. See Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2680 (4th Cir. 
Feb. 23, 2000).  Virginia remains one of the few remaining states that permanently 
disenfranchises felons.  The fee at issue here goes toward an application for gubernatorial 
clemency, the only option available for restoring voting rights in Virginia. 
 219. The Twenty-fourth Amendment prohibits the use of a state poll tax or any other 
tax to “deny or abridge” the right of citizens to vote in federal primary and general 
elections.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.  In Harman v. Forssenius, the Supreme Court held 
that the Twenty-fourth Amendment also prohibits requirements that are the functional 
equivalent of a poll tax.  See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540-41 (1965). 
 220. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).  The Supreme Court 
declared that poll taxes serving as a prerequisite for voting in state elections were 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 
670. 
 221. In Harper, the court noted: 
When it comes to voting, [the state] is limited to the power to fix qualifications.  
Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate 
intelligently in the electoral process.  Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or 
property, like those of race . . . are traditionally disfavored . . . and we say 
nothing to impair its validity so long as it is not made a condition to the 
exercise of the franchise. 
Id. at 668-69. 
 222. Howard, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2680, at *4-5 (emphasis added). 
 223. See supra discussion of Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (finding that 
there is no fundamental right to vote for felons), at notes 54-69 and accompanying text.  
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The issue continued to present itself in both state and federal court 
systems.  For instance, in 2007, a divided Washington Supreme Court, 
sitting en banc, upheld a Washington state statute
224
 that conditioned 
felons’ re-enfranchisement upon completion of all terms of their 
sentences, including payment of all LFOs such as court costs, fees, and 
victim restitution.
225
  Importantly, the court characterized the financial 
conditions for re-enfranchisement as a continuing part of the requirement 
of discharging a felon’s criminal sentence, rather than a restoration of 
rights after a criminal sentence.
226
  Moreover, in continuing to 
distinguish Harper and rejecting respondents’ claim that the statute’s 
payment requirements function as an unconstitutional poll tax, the court 
noted that the Virginia citizens in the Harper case possessed a 
fundamental right to vote, whereas the respondents in the instant case did 
not.  The court noted, “Convicted felons . . . no longer possess that 
fundamental right as a direct result of their decisions to commit a 
felony.”227  Having affirmed the essential rationale of Richardson v. 
Ramirez, that felons possess no fundamental right to vote, the court then 
proceeded to undertake a rational basis analysis of Washington’s re-
enfranchisement scheme. 
Rejecting arguments that payment of LFOs are not a legitimate state 
interest that provide a rational basis for the re-enfranchisement statute, 
the court opined that “[t]he State clearly has an interest in ensuring that 
felons complete all of the terms of their sentence, and there is no 
requirement that the State restore voting rights to felons until they do 
so.”228  The court also quickly dispensed with the important underlying 
question animating the challenge to the statute:  whether the statute 
discriminated against low-income felons unable to pay their LFOs by 
creating an unconstitutional wealth-based condition.  On this issue, the 
court engaged in a bit of circular logic.  The court noted that ex-felons 
had failed to establish that a felon’s right to vote qualifies as an 
important right under federal case law based on the rationale of 
Richardson and noted that “even though low-income felons may not be 
accountable for their wealth status, they have been adjudicated 
 
It stands to reason that, if strict scrutiny analysis is not to be applied to felons’ voting 
rights, then it cannot be applied to the restoration of those rights either. 
 224. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637(1) (2012). 
 225. Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 770 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).  The court rejected 
challenges based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Washington 
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  See id. 
 226. See id. at 771 (“[It] is not Washington’s re-enfranchisement statute that denies 
felons the right to vote but rather the continuing applicability of its disenfranchisement 
scheme.”). 
 227. See id. 
 228. See id. at 772. 
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responsible for their status as felons. . . .”229  While the court conceded 
that the requirement that felons pay their LFOs in full might affect felons 
disparately “based on their differing income statuses,” they pronounced 
that “this alone does not establish an equal protection violation.”230 
Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit case of Harvey v. Brewer, the court 
upheld an Arizona law that automatically restores the right to vote to 
one-time felons who complete their sentences and pay any fines or 
restitution imposed upon them.
231
  The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument 
challenging the law was that, because they had served the entirety of 
their prison terms for a lone felony conviction, the only thing preventing 
them from having their voting rights automatically reinstated was their 
failure to pay the criminal fines and restitution orders included in their 
sentences.
232
  This requirement, they argued, discriminated based on 
wealth and conditioned the right to vote on payment of a fee.  Like the 
Supreme Court of Washington, the Ninth Circuit upheld the repayment 
requirement on ground that “Arizona has a rational basis for restoring 
voting rights only to those felons who have completed the terms of their 
sentences, which includes the payment of any fines or restitution 
orders.”233  The panel continued: 
Just as States might reasonably conclude that perpetrators of serious 
crimes should not take part in electing government officials, so too 
might it rationally conclude that only those who have satisfied their 
debts to society through fulfilling the terms of a criminal sentence 
[including payment of criminal justice-related financial obligations] 
are entitled to restoration of their voting rights.
234
 
In sum, all of the appellate courts that have considered the issue
235
 
have concluded that payment of LFOs before the restoration of voting 
 
 229. Madison, 163 P.3d at 769. 
 230. See id. 
 231. Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We have little trouble 
concluding that Arizona has a rational basis for restoring voting rights only to those 
felons who have completed the terms of their sentences, which includes the payment of 
any fines or restitution orders.”). 
 232. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–912(A)(2) (2011). 
 233. Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079. 
 234. See id. 
 235. Other circuits dodged the question of wealth-based restoration of voting rights 
when confronted with the issue.  See Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 
(11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).  This case primarily involved a Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause and Voting Rights Act challenge to Florida’s felon disenfranchisement 
law which provides that “[n]o person convicted of a felony . . . shall be qualified to vote 
or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability.”  FLA. CONST. art. 
VI, § 4 (1968).  Plaintiffs also alleged discrimination in Florida’s re-enfranchisement 
process based on the imposition of improper poll tax and wealth qualifications.  The court 
rejected the argument that the voting rights restoration scheme violated the prohibition 
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rights is constitutional, regardless of a person’s ability to pay.  Because 
Richardson v. Ramirez allows courts to render felons’ voting rights less 
than fundamental, courts have engaged in the use of this legal formality 
and have avoided the implications of permanent or long-term 
disenfranchisement of low-income ex-felons who cannot pay LFOs.
236
 
B. Child Support:  The Curious Case of Johnson v. Bredesen 
The 2010 case of Johnson v. Bredesen
237
 represents a stark 
expansion of re-enfranchisement schemes requiring payment of LFOs 
prior to the restoration of voting rights. 
The history of the Bredesen case is intriguing.  Before 2006, 
Tennessee had perhaps one of the “most irrational and confusing felony 
disenfranchisement laws in the nation.”238  The Brennan Center for 
Justice worked with state advocates and the American Civil Liberties 
Union in 2005 to draft a bill that would streamline and standardize these 
complex restoration procedures.
239
  The originally proposed bill failed in 
the Tennessee House of Representatives, but, in the following year, the 
legislature passed an amended version of the bill standardizing 
 
against poll tax, noting that, under Florida’s Rules of Executive Clemency, the right to 
vote could still possibly be granted to felons who cannot afford to pay restitution.  
Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1216 n.1.  In this instance, the 11th Circuit declined to address 
whether conditioning an application for clemency on paying restitution would be an 
invalid poll tax under the law, since the court did not need to reach that question.  Id. 
 236. In 2006, the ACLU in Washington State discovered that “[s]tatistics from the 
Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) show that only a fraction of the 
individuals released from prison have been issued a Certificate of Discharge” and that 
“[t]he primary obstacle is their inability to satisfy legal financial obligations.”  See AM. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH., VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION STATISTICS FOR 
WASHINGTON STATE (2006), available at http://bit.ly/Sb2YOr.  Consequently, the 
Washington State legislature adopted new rules to allow for automatic voter restoration.  
However, the ACLU noted that, under the new provisions:  “If you miss 3 scheduled 
LFO payments in a year, a court may revoke your right to vote.  This is a provision of the 
new law, and it is unclear how it will work in practice.”  See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
OF WASH., WASHINGTON’S NEW VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION PROCESS (2010). 
 237. Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 238. See Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Tennessee: Current Felony 
Disenfranchisement Laws, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://bit.ly/PcIlPW (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter RESTORATION EFFORTS IN TENNESSEE]  (“People who were 
convicted before July 1, 1986, must petition a court for restoration of voting rights, and 
various prosecutors are given an opportunity to object.  People convicted after June 30, 
1996, are subject to the same rules, except that those convicted of murder, rape, treason, 
or voter fraud are permanently disenfranchised.  These exceptions pertain also to people 
convicted between July 1, 1986 and July 1, 1996, but others convicted during that period 
may petition for administrative restoration of rights, without a potentially adversarial 
court hearing.”). 
 239. See id. (“That bill passed in the state senate but failed by eleven votes in the 
house.”). 
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restoration by allowing for a certificate of discharge upon release
240
 after 
completion of a maximum prison sentence or probation or parole 
terms.
241
  As was its goal, the legislature managed to adopt a greatly 
simplified restoration procedure.
242
  But there was a catch.  Tennessee’s 
amended bill added two new exceptions to re-enfranchisement 
eligibility.
243
  The new legislation provided that: 
(b) . . . a person shall not be eligible to apply for a voter registration 
card and have the right of suffrage restored, unless the person: 
(1) Has paid all restitution to the victim or victims of the 
offense ordered by the court as part of the sentence [and] . . . 
(c) . . . a person shall not be eligible to apply for a voter registration 
card and have the right of suffrage restored, unless the person is 
current in all child support obligations.
244
 
A requirement for payment of restitution is in keeping with earlier cases, 
where statutes were upheld because financial obligations were 
considered an ongoing part of the underlying criminal conviction.
245
  
Here, the restitution provision of the amended statute has a relationship 
to the completion of the terms of one’s criminal sentence.  However, the 
 
 240. See id. (“[The bill] eliminates any adversarial proceeding.  Now, any person 
convicted of an infamous crime, except some of those convicted of murder, treason, rape, 
voter fraud, and sexual offenses, receives a certificate of discharge upon completion of 
their maximum prison sentence or their probation or parole terms.  This certificate 
verifies that the individual is qualified to register and vote.”). 
 241. See id. (“This certificate verifies that the individual is qualified to register and 
vote.”). 
 242. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 243. The re-enfranchisement statute at issue restores felons’ eligibility “to apply for a 
voter registration card and have the right of suffrage restored” upon receipt of a pardon, 
discharge from custody after serving the maximum sentence imposed, or final discharge 
by the relevant county, state, or federal authority.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202 
(2010).  The statute, however, carves out two exceptions to re-enfranchisement 
eligibility.  Id. 
 244. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-29-202 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 245. The statute was later amended to require payment of court costs as well.  The full 
text of the amended bill is as follows: 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), a person shall not be 
eligible to apply for a voter registration card and have the right of suffrage 
restored, unless the person: 
(1) Has paid all restitution to the victim or victims of the offense ordered 
by the court as part of the sentence; and 
(2) Beginning September 1, 2010, notwithstanding the provisions of 
subsection (a), a person shall not be eligible to apply for a voter 
registration card and have the right of suffrage restored, unless the person 
has paid all court costs assessed against the person at the conclusion of the 
person’s trial, except where the court has made a finding at an evidentiary 
hearing that the applicant is indigent at the time of application. 
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-29-202(b) (2010). 
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requirement of paying all outstanding child support obligations was 
entirely novel.  A court has never required payment of a debt that was 
completely unrelated to the underlying crime in order to reestablish 
voting privileges.  In this sense, Bredesen represents a wide departure 
and an expansion from previous cases. 
The Bredesen plaintiffs, child support obligors who were too poor 
to satisfy current obligations, challenged Tennessee’s statutory provision 
conditioning felons’ right to vote on their ability to pay LFOs, namely 
child support arrears or restitution.
246
  In their complaint, the plaintiffs 
alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Twenty-fourth 
Amendment, and Ex Post Facto and Privileges and Immunities Clauses 
of federal and state constitutions.
247
  In a split-panel opinion issued by 
the Sixth Circuit, the court upheld Tennessee’s amended law requiring 
payment of restitution and all child support obligations before restoring 
the right to vote to ex-felons. 
With respect to the equal protection claim, the majority applied the 
rational basis test, rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention that strict scrutiny 
should be the standard for reviewing a statute restricting the fundamental 
right to vote.  Like the earlier fee and restitution cases, the court noted 
the restraint on voting by felons that was articulated in Richardson v. 
Ramirez,
248
 opining that “[t]he state may, within the bounds of the 
Constitution, strip convicted felons of their voting rights,” and, having 
“lost their voting rights, Plaintiffs lack any fundamental interest to 
assert.”249  Then, after applying the rational basis standard, the panel 
found that “the state’s interests of encouraging payment of child support 
and compliance with court orders, and requiring felons to complete their 
entire sentences, including paying victim restitution, supply a rational 
basis for the challenged statutory provisions sufficient to pass 
constitutional muster.”250  The fact that the child support debt was 
unrelated to the underlying crime for which the felons were 
disenfranchised was of no consequence, as the court declined to require 
 
 246. See RESTORATION EFFORTS IN TENNESSEE, supra note 238.  The Brennan Center 
brief argued that Tennessee’s law functions as an illegal poll tax in violation of the 24th 
Amendment, relying on the Amendment’s legislative history, case law interpreting the 
Amendment, and policy arguments. 
 247. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).  The United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted Defendant’s motion for 
judgment on pleadings.  This article analyzes the Equal Protection and 24th Amendment 
challenges at the Sixth Circuit.  The court upheld the statute against all of the 
constitutional challenges. 
 248. See discussion supra Part I.B and accompanying notes. 
 249. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 746. 
 250. See id. at 747. 
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Regarding the Twenty-fourth Amendment claim, the majority 
concluded that the right to vote was not being abridged for “failure to 
pay any poll tax or other tax.”  The court reasoned, as in Howard v. 
Gilmore, that the Tennessee statute “does not deny or abridge any rights; 
it only restores them.”252  In short, “Plaintiffs possess no right to vote 
and, consequently, have no cognizable Twenty-fourth Amendment 
claim.”253  The court further noted that the challenged provisions “do not 
disenfranchise them or anyone else, poor or otherwise,” reasoning that, 
“Tennessee’s indisputably constitutional disenfranchisement statute 
accomplished that.”254 
Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore issued a powerful dissent, 
arguing that, by law, Tennessee “may curtail a felon’s right to vote, or 
even forever deny it, but once a state enacts a process by which a felon 
may regain suffrage, that process must comport with the demands of the 
Constitution.”255  Judge Moore articulated a clear rationale for her 
 
 251. See Gerald L. Neuman, Equal Protection, “General Equality” and Economic 
Discrimination from a U.S. Perspective, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 281, 292 (1999) (“The 
rationale need not demonstrate a close relationship between the distinction and its 
underlying purpose . . . the Court is very tolerant of overbroad generalizations that may 
be instrumentally useful, and does not require employment of less restrictive alternatives 
or a proportionality test.”). 
 252. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 753 (“Significantly, Tennessee child support law, 
which conditions payment on the payor’s ability to earn a living so as to avoid imposing a 
penal obligation, exists to protect children; and restitution payments aim to restore crime 
victims to the position they would have been in had the crime not occurred—not to 
punish the perpetrator.”). 
 253. See id. at 751.  Disenfranchisement laws are considered regulatory rather than 
punitive.  In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court expressly stated that felon 
disenfranchisement laws serve a regulatory, non-penal purpose.  See Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958).  Scholars have vigorously questioned this contention.  See, e.g., 
Karlan, supra note 4 at 1150 (“The view that disenfranchisement is not punitive rests on a 
long-since-repudiated conception of the right to vote.”); Miller, supra note 4, at 32 
(“[F]elony disenfranchisement should not be characterized as a sanction for criminal 
conduct: It fits none of the usual justifications for punishment.”). 
 254. TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 5.  Elections and suffrage, Tennessee’s 
disenfranchisement statute, states:  “The elections shall be free and equal, and the right of 
suffrage, as hereinafter declared, shall never be denied to any person entitled thereto, 
except upon conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and 
declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.” 
 255. Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 754 (Moore, J., dissenting).  In her dissent, Judge Moore 
stated: 
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I would hold that Tennessee Code § 40-
29-202(b) and (c) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Tennessee Constitution.  I further believe 
that the Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient factual matter to state a claim for 
relief under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution such that 
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dissent:  that individuals who can afford to satisfy financial obligations 
and those who cannot are not similarly situated, and that the law cannot 
justify wealth-based distinctions in restricting voting rights even under 
the rational basis test.  Judge Moore concluded, “The effective result of 
the State’s attempt to justify [the statute’s exceptions to re-
enfranchisement] as a legitimate way to limit access to the ballot box is 
that the State has injected wealth as a determinative factor in an arena 
where it simply has no place.”256  She further asserted, “It is indisputable 
that the Plaintiffs are now unable to access the ballot box simply because 
they are too poor to pay.”257 
The same Tennessee re-enfranchisement statute was further 
amended in 2010 to also require payment of all court costs assessed 
against a person.
258
  This is but one indication that the expansion of legal 
barriers to re-enfranchisement continues unabated, as none of the 
constitutional challenges in these cases have been successful or even 
subject to rigorous debate.  It remains to be seen whether Tennessee’s 
approach, requiring payment of debts other than LFOs, will be adopted 
by other jurisdictions.  However, there is reason to be concerned about 
this development.  Mounting carceral debt owed by prisoners serves to 
bring to the surface important constitutional and pragmatic questions 
about the effect of debt as a barrier to the franchise and highlights courts’ 
use of legal doctrine to sidestep the critical ramifications of restoring the 
important right to vote only to those who can pay their debts. 
IV. OUT FROM THE SHADOWS:  THE IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINALIZING 
DEBT 
Illuminating the contradictions of limiting voting rights to those 
who can afford to pay allows us to foresee the broader implications of 
carceral debt.  In the modern era, courts maintain an incongruous and 
 
dismissal on the pleadings was improper.  For the following reasons, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
Id. 
 256. See id. at 758-59 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (stating that “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is 
not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process . . . ,” and 
wealth, as a measure of a voter’s qualification, is nothing more than a “capricious or 
irrelevant factor” that cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny). 
 257. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 755, 757 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Tennessee 
statute here is ‘ludicrously ineffectual’ at encouraging the payment of child-support 
arrears as it makes no accommodation for individuals like the Plaintiffs who simply 
cannot pay despite a willingness to do so.”) (quoting Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 
(1982)). 
 258. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202(b) (2010) (providing that these costs are assessed 
“at the conclusion of the person’s trial, except where the court has made a finding at an 
evidentiary hearing that the applicant is indigent at the time of application.”). 
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self-perpetuating two-tier voting rights jurisprudence.  The right to vote 
is fundamental for non-felons, requiring strict scrutiny analysis of state 
laws that infringe on that right.  Simultaneously, courts allow a 
deferential rational basis analysis for would-be voters with felony 
convictions, framed as the regulatory restoration of voting rights.  Such 
an approach amounts to an analytical trick, which shields courts from a 
more exacting inquiry into the rationality of the laws that separate felons 
from their important exercise of voting rights.  Despite the historical 
antecedents for doing so,
259
 these divergent approaches run counter to the 
modern notion of an expanding democracy.  They also legalize 
discrimination. 
A. Irrational Basis: Wealth Based Conditions on the Right to Vote 
The attempt to incentivize payments that an individual is simply 
incapable of making by linking those payments to the right to 
vote . . . advances no purpose and embodies nothing more than an 
attempt to exercise unbridled power over a clearly powerless group, 
which is not a legitimate state interest.
260
 
Judge Moore offered this observation in her dissent in Bredesen, 
highlighting an important issue.  With rare exceptions, courts do not 
analyze the state’s purpose for upholding laws under rational basis 
review.  It is true that contemporary jurisprudence allows for almost 
automatic assent to legislative policy prerogatives.  Therefore, courts in 
these cases fail to confront the disparate impact of carceral debt on low-
income obligors, choosing instead to focus on their “voluntarily” 
incurred status as felons.
261
  Nevertheless, as Judge Moore’s quote above 
indicates, a court might reasonably conclude that the state’s purpose—
i.e., making voting rights contingent on paying debt that an ex-felon 
cannot afford—is simply irrational.  While the level of deference 
accorded to lawmakers is staggering, it is not the case that all legislation 
must survive a rational basis analysis. 
 
 259. These justifications for disenfranchisement primarily take two forms:  “The first 
is that ex-felons should be disenfranchised because they have broken the social contract; 
the second is that they should be excluded because only the virtuous are morally 
competent to participate in governing society.”  See Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, 
supra note 4, at 1304.  However, these rationales do not resonate in the modern era of 
expanding democratic participation. 
 260. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 757 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“I find entirely 
unconvincing the majority’s conclusion that [the bill] constitute[s] a rational way to 
encourage Tennessee’s legitimate interest in the collection of outstanding financial 
obligations or encourage compliance with court orders imposing such obligations.”). 
 261. See id. 
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For example, in Romer v. Evans,
262
 the U.S. Supreme Court used 
the rational basis test to invalidate Colorado’s Amendment Two, an 
initiative that encouraged discrimination based on sexual orientation.
263
  
Although lesbians and gays are not a suspect class for the purpose of 
equal protection analysis, the court opined that the initiative failed to 
survive even rational basis review because “the amendment has the 
peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a 
single named group, an exceptional and . . . invalid form of 
legislation.”264  Animating the decision to strike down Amendment Two 
is the Court’s conclusion that the ostensible purpose behind the law was 
animus against gays and lesbians, an impermissible motivation.
265
  No 
doubt the Bredesen majority would deny animus in upholding the state’s 
expressed purpose for the Tennessee amendment,
266
 which is described 
therein as the state’s interest in “protecting the ballot box from convicted 
felons who continue to break the law by failing to comply with court 
orders, encouraging payment of child support, and requiring felons to 
complete their entire sentences, including paying victim restitution.”267  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how at least some of those justifications 
are not motivated by animus.  Within these cases, and throughout 
modern and historical jurisprudence, ex-felons are referred to 
disparagingly and suffer a particular kind of stigma, social exclusion, and 
opprobrium that provides a rationale for disparate treatment.  At the same 
time, the application of the law operates at cross-purposes with some of 
society’s loftier goals, such as encouraging widespread democratic 
participation. 
What then, of the disparate impact of re-enfranchisement laws on 
poor felons generally, given the strong correlation of incarceration with 
poverty?  Can poor ex-felons, as a class, challenge the disparate effects 
of laws that reinforce shadow citizenship?  Unfortunately, when the 
 
 262. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 263. See id. at 620. 
 264. See id. at 632. 
 265. Id. (“[The] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that 
the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it 
lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”). 
 266. The Bredesen court uses Sixth Circuit jurisprudence quoting Romer to justify its 
rationale for upholding the statute, as well as problems arising from wealth disparity.  See 
E. Brooks Books, Inc. v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 588 F.3d 360, 364 (6th Cir. 2009) (“‘[A] 
law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if 
the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the 
rationale for it seems tenuous.’”) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).  The 
Bredesen court opines, “While the dissent would prefer that the state not discriminate on 
the basis of wealth when providing statutory benefits, this is an argument that must be 
resolved by the legislature, not this Court.”  See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 748. 
 267. See id. at 747. 
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Supreme Court has considered the rights of the poor as a group under 
equal protection doctrine, “it has not been predisposed to consider class 
as a suspect category that can or should be specially protected.”268  Most 
scholars concede that the Supreme Court has held that the poor are not a 
suspect class under equal protection doctrine and, therefore, are not 
entitled to heightened scrutiny of laws.
269
  But re-enfranchisement 
statutes have a particularly acute disparate impact on poor debtors in that 
they serve as a barrier to regaining suffrage, a burden on an undoubtedly 
important right.  Interestingly, in the Ninth Circuit case of Harvey v. 
Brewer,
270
 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, sitting by designation, hints 
that such a disproportionate negative impact might compel a different 
result, noting that “[p]erhaps withholding voting rights from those who 
are truly unable to pay their criminal fines due to indigency would not 
pass this rational basis test. . . .”271  However, the court sidestepped the 
issue in that case, stating, “[W]e do not address that possibility because 
no plaintiff in this case has alleged that he is indigent.”272  Thus, even 
under the deferential rational basis standard, Justice O’Connor was 
correct to question the legitimacy of laws that stand as an obstacle to 
voting for low-income felons specifically.  Many, if not most, ex-felons 
are in fact indigent, not to mention politically powerless.  Moreover, 
these laws cannot be reconciled with legitimate state interests for a 
number of important reasons. 
First, as Judge Moore insightfully observed, conditioning 
restoration of voting rights on the payment of LFOs and other debts, such 
as child support, provides no incentive value whatsoever if ex-felons are 
unable to pay them, even if the state’s collection of these financial 
 
 268. Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and 
Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 112-13 (2009) 
(“[T]he Court has questioned whether certain denials of services and benefits to the poor 
even merit constitutional consideration.  This position is compounded by the fact that, for 
equal-protection claims, the Court is generally concerned only with the government’s 
purposeful use of invidious classifications.”). 
 269. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 806 
(4th ed. 2012) (“In San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court expressly 
held that poverty is not a suspect classification and that discrimination against the poor 
should only receive rational basis review.”); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 
(1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect 
classification.”).  But see Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal 
Protection Clause: An Open Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407, 407 (2010) 
(arguing that “the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the poor are a quasi-
suspect class or a suspect class under Equal Protection.”). 
 270. Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 271. See Brewer, 605 F.3d at 1080. 
 272. See id. 
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obligations would typically constitute a legitimate interest.
273
  Such an 
approach lays bare an alternative motivation for these conditions:  to 
continue punishing ex-felons for their crimes.  Such a motivation is an 
inappropriate use of civil restoration procedures, which are intended to 
be regulatory rather than punitive, and should not be sustained in 
circumstances where demonstrated indigency is the only barrier to the 
restoration of voting rights.  Further, many of the debts incurred by 
felons are not directly related to their criminal acts, and so are not 
“incurred” by them in the way that we normally understand the accrual 
of debt.  For instance, state “user fees” constitute a growing percentage 
of debt owed by prisoners, but are assessed to prisoners to shore up state 
coffers rather than designated as a part of an offender’s criminal 
sentence.  Similarly, child support arrears tend to mount heavily during 
incarceration,
274
 despite the fact that prisoners earn little or no money.  
While the debt accrued technically becomes an obligation that is owed 
by prisoners, the debt is not tied to a parent’s earning capacity, as is 
required under traditional family law concepts, and therefore represents 
an illegitimate debt.  Here, as with criminal justice debt, arrears are 
linked to punishment of prisoners for their bad acts, in this case being 
imprisoned and unable to provide support for children.  Moreover, there 
is no reason that debt should become a barrier to voting, because the 
debt, illegitimate or otherwise, will continue to remain an obligation after 
release.  If prisoners can afford to pay, they will likely risk re-arrest if 
their failure to pay is willful.
275
  If they cannot pay, incarceration runs 
afoul of the tenets of Bearden v. Georgia,
276
 which require an inquiry 
into a person’s ability to pay and whether there are adequate alternatives 
to imprisonment.
277
  Re-enfranchisement laws that condition voting on 
the repayment of LFOs are irrational in the sense that they are both 
punitive and unlikely to achieve their stated purposes. 
Second, as noted earlier in this article, the costs of LFOs and child 
support debt can be enormous in the aggregate.  As a practical matter, 
conditioning re-enfranchisement on the payment of these debts in full, as 
 
 273. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 756 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“I fail to see how 
preconditioning suffrage on a payment that a person is unable to make is in any rational 
way related to the government’s interest in promoting that payment.”). 
 274. In addition to child support order mounting, many states apply compounded 
interest to child support, which become judgments by operation of law immediately after 
they go unpaid. 
 275. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 276. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
 277. See id. at 672 (“Only if the sentencing court determines that alternatives to 
imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the State’s interest in 
punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a probationer who has made sufficient 
bona fide efforts to pay.”). 
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many statutes require, can render ex-felons permanently disenfranchised 
because they will never be able to satisfy them.  In most states, this level 
of disenfranchisement is no longer tolerated, as they have adjusted their 
disenfranchisement laws to allow for re-enfranchisement at some point 
after release, a path that states have chosen as a deliberate policy 
prerogative.  Allowing debt that is keyed to financial capacity to become 
a barrier to re-enfranchisement constitutes an end run around the 
conscious liberalization of disenfranchisement laws, which are publicly 
altered through statutory amendment or executive order. 
Third, requiring the payment of all LFOs is not rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest because it is steeped in bad public policy.  Just 
because the law permits courts to require payment of fees does not mean 
that it is wise to do so.
278
  Because it is clear that financial obligations 
will become a practical barrier for many ex-felons, this requirement 
undermines another equally important public purpose:  the successful 
reintegration of ex-offenders.  As a society, it is in the collective interest 
to embrace people with criminal convictions and encourage a return to 
civic participation.  In fact, this prerogative is articulated in many places, 
not least of which is the Second Chance Act,
279
 federal legislation that 
directly articulates the need for and funds supportive services to foster 
effective reentry.  The resumption of voting rights is tied to this overall 
process of reintegration.  As felons are defined by their legal relationship 
with the state and their separation from their fellow citizens,
280
 restricting 
the right to vote along with other barriers makes performing the duties of 
citizenship difficult.
281
  Moreover, the rights of citizenship have an 
important effect on the reduction of crime, prompting sociologists Manza 
and Uggen to remark, “The basic relationship between crime and voting 
is now clear: Those who vote are less likely to be arrested and 
incarcerated, and less likely to report committing a range of property and 
violent offenses.”282  Given the importance of democratic participation to 
 
 278. See Tova Andrea Wang, Competing Values or False Choices: Coming to 
Consensus on the Election Reform Debate in Washington State and the Country, 29 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353, 380 (“The issue of felon voting, and . . . automatic re-
enfranchisement of ex-felons . . ., is an area in which the values of administrative ease, 
finality, and ensuring voting integrity do not conflict with the values of opening up the 
process and ensuring voting rights.”). 
 279. See Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008).  
This first-of-its-kind legislation authorizes federal grants to government agencies and 
nonprofit organizations to provide employment assistance, substance abuse treatment, 
housing, family programming, mentoring, victim support, and other services that can help 
reduce recidivism. 
 280. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 1, at 125 (“[L]imitations and disqualifications 
[on voting rights] hinder reintegrative efforts . . . [and] affect recidivism.”). 
 281. See id. at 127. 
 282. See id. at 133. 
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crime reduction, it is surprising that questions about the legitimacy of 
wealth-based conditions for ex-felons that threaten reintegration remains 
an issue that the courts have thus far refused to engage with any depth. 
Finally, the intractable relationship among race, class, and 
criminalization provide an opportunity to acknowledge the potential 
crisis of conditioning voter restoration on payment of financial 
obligations and other debt.  African Americans are statistically more 
likely to live in poverty and are disproportionately impacted by 
incarceration.
283
  Therefore, the co-recurring effect of incarceration and 
poverty would greatly exacerbate the effects of social inequality in a way 
that would harshly affect African Americans, an effect that clearly does 
not represent a legitimate state interest.  In fact, the nexus among race, 
class, and incarceration could reasonably compel a greater level of equal 
protection scrutiny than class analysis alone receives.  To this end, legal 
scholars Mario L. Barnes and Erwin Chemerinsky suggest that the 
intersection of race and class might require a heightened scrutiny and 
posit, “One should need no other basis to call for closer scrutiny than the 
obvious truth that poverty takes on the character of a stigmatizing 
identity category.  This stigma alone is powerful but also interacts in 
myriad and complex ways with race, a classification that receives strict 
scrutiny.”284  In any event, the enhanced negative effect of criminal 
justice-related debt on African Americans creates an additional and 
profound concern for a community already shouldering the 
disproportional effects of mass incarceration and further calls into 
question the rationality of restoration statutes that condition voting rights 
on the payment of debt. 
For these reasons, the requirement that ex-felons pay all LFOs or 
other debt before they are allowed to restore voting rights is simply not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest and also runs counter to 
significant policy prerogatives that should be further illuminated within 
the policy discourse surrounding prisoners and reentry.  While courts 
have upheld legislation that conditions re-enfranchisement on payment of 
LFOs,
285
 there have been strong signs of dissent within the judiciary.  
 
 283. See Western & Pettit, supra note 16, at 9. 
 284. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 268, at 119-21 (“Poverty certainly shares 
many of the characteristics that warrant heightened scrutiny for race.  There has been a 
long history of discrimination against the poor, often in ways that are invisible to those 
with resources.  The poor are politically powerless.”). 
 285. The Bredesen court, for example, is unabashed in its approval of the Tennessee 
statute authorizing an exception to re-enfranchisement when petitioners are not current in 
child support obligations, despite its adverse effects on the poor, noting that “[t]he statute 
is not aimed at encouraging the collection of payments from indigent felons, but from all 
felons.  The legislature may have been concerned, for instance, that a specific exemption 
for indigent felons would provide an incentive to conceal assets and would result in the 
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These dissenting voices, as well as others rejecting the current analysis of 
this problem, can point the way to a more nuanced discourse should the 
issue ultimately present itself in other jurisdictions for consideration, or 
ultimately find its way to the Supreme Court. 
B. Looking Forward:  Debtors’ Prison Redux 
The obstacles faced by ex-felons who seek to contribute to the 
national polity through the resumption of voting rights demand attention.  
However, the specter of debt and its negative effects has consequences 
beyond the rights and obligations of former prisoners:  mounting debt 
has far-reaching repercussions for low-income people generally. 
People on the economic margins are always potential shadow 
citizens, as their circumstances may at any time tip over into the realm of 
economic vulnerability that leads to a lessened privacy status and state 
intervention.
286
  Scholar Kaaryn Gustafson has asserted that welfare 
recipients are relegated to an inferior status of citizenship with 
diminished constitutional protections.  She compares their treatment and 
status to that of parolees and probationers,
287
 observing, “Government 
welfare policies increasingly treat the poor as a criminal class. . . .”288  
Gustafson uses the term criminalization in this context to describe a web 
of state policies and practices related to welfare involving the 
“stigmatization, surveillance, and regulation of the poor.”289 
For many working class Americans, the status of being poor, with 
all its attendant indignities, is increasingly close at hand.  In September 
2011, the Census Bureau reported that the number of Americans living in 
poverty was the highest number recorded in 52 years.
290
  The ongoing 
financial crisis and recession has taken a significant toll on Americans in 
the middle and lower income brackets.
291
  These families have a tenuous 
 
state being unable to compel payments from some non-indigent felons.  That the state 
used a shotgun instead of a rifle to accomplish its legitimate end is of no moment under 
rational basis review.”  Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 748. 
 286. See Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to 
Privacy?, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 181, 181 (1991) (“[T]here is no governmental duty 
to provide the necessities of life and no governmental omission which can be thought to 
be a constitutional violation.”). 
 287. Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 643, 646-47 (2009). 
 288. See id. at 644. 
 289. See id. at 647. 
 290. See Sabrina Tavernise, Poverty Rate Soars to Highest Level Since 1993, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011, available at http://bit.ly/T7Y4CL (“Economists pointed to a 
telling statistic: It was the first time since the Great Depression that the median household 
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 291. See id.  The Census Bureau also indicates that a 15.1% poverty level was the 
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hold on survival and are increasingly mired in debt.  As noted earlier, 
state laws have historically shielded debtors from incarceration, while 
criminal justice debt provides constitutional cover to enforce obligations 
arising from criminal justice involvement.  However, that civil-criminal 
distinction may not be as clear-cut as one might imagine.  Recent 
developments pertaining to the enforcement of commercial debt provides 
a cautionary tale and potentially blurs the line. 
In 2011, an article by the Wall Street Journal exposed a common 
practice of the U.S. debt-collection industry’s copious use of arrest 
warrants to recoup money owed by borrowers who are behind on credit-
card payments, auto loans, and other bills.
292
  While incarceration for 
civil debt is specifically prohibited in most jurisdictions, “[m]ore than a 
third of all U.S. states allow borrowers who can’t or won’t pay to be 
jailed” under certain circumstances.293  A judge can generally issue arrest 
warrants if a borrower defies a court order to repay a debt or does not 
show up in court.
294
  One problem is that many of those who fail to 
appear have not received proper notice of the court appearance, as some 
are not even aware that lawsuits have been filed against them.
295
  This 
woman’s story is fairly common: 
She was driving home when an officer pulled her over for having a 
loud muffler.  But instead of sending her off with a warning, the 
officer arrested [her] and she was taken right to jail.  “That’s when I 
found out [that] I had a warrant for failure to appear in Macoupin 
County.  And I didn’t know what it was about.”  She owed $730 on a 
medical bill.  She says she didn’t even know a collection agency had 
filed a lawsuit against her . . . She spent four days in jail waiting for 
her father to raise $500 for her bail.  That money was then turned 
over to the collection agency
296
 
Debt collectors use harsh tactics, such as routinely requesting 
warrants against debtors to leverage some kind of payment.
297
  The 
number of debt-related warrants has increased so dramatically that states 
are beginning to investigate abuses of the court system that are used to 
 
 292. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition, WALL 
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compel compliance with financial judgments.
298
  The Federal Trade 
Commission received more than 140,000 complaints related to debt 
collection in 2010, almost 25,000 more than the previous year.
299
  While 
many civil debtors are not incarcerated for more than a few days when 
arrested, incarceration can have a psychologically debilitating effect, 
occurring without notice, with arrests taking place in front of loved ones, 
including children.
300
  It can also disrupt employment and sometimes 
result in the loss of jobs, an event that leads to further economic 
marginalization.  A single arrest, even without a conviction for any 
crime, has the potential to affect an individual’s overall employability 
moving forward.
301
  For example, 36 states allow all employers and 
occupational licensing agencies to inquire about, consider, and make 
hiring decisions based on arrests that never led to a conviction.
302
 
As earlier sections of this article demonstrate, once a person is 
caught in the vortex of criminalization, debt arises from the criminal 
justice system itself through the imposition of court costs, fees, and 
restitution.  Thus, the emerging practice of incarcerating civil debtors, no 
matter how short a time, foreshadows trouble for those living on the 
economic margins, in numbers that have increased significantly during 
an era of economic recession.  We have seen, over time, how society has 
embraced an economic paradigm where the costs of incarceration have 
shifted to those people who are subject to its indignities, namely 
prisoners, and increasingly to their family members as well.  In 2011, the 
state of Arizona enacted new legislation—the first in the nation—
allowing its Department of Corrections to impose a $25 fee, designated 
as a “background check fee,” on adults who wish to visit inmates at any 
of the 15 prison complexes in the state.
303
  Officials confirmed that these 
fees were intended to compensate for a $1.6 billion deficit that the state 
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faced in 2011.
304
  Thus, the criminalization of debt continues to have its 
most direct impact on those in the criminal justice system and other 
members of the community who can least afford it. 
CONCLUSION 
It is important to eradicate laws that mandate the 
disenfranchisement of felons, but this alone is not enough to fulfill the 
promise of reintegration and the resumption of social citizenship.  To 
fully appreciate the widespread negative impact of felony 
disenfranchisement on democracy in the United States, the self-
perpetuating and mutually reinforcing aspects of subordination that 
characterize the disenfranchisement/re-enfranchisement paradigm must 
be rendered visible.  Class and race-based stigma, collateral 
consequences, onerous re-enfranchisement requirements, and burgeoning 
carceral debt create obstacles that have rendered a growing segment of 
the U.S. population, and their families, “shadow citizens.” 
These informal obstacles and shadow citizen status are further 
buttressed by a formalistic legal framework that allows courts to affirm 
specific barriers to re-enfranchisement that are conditioned on payment 
of criminal justice-related and other unrelated debt, such as child support 
obligations.  Such conditions foster a constitutionally suspect paradigm 
whereby some people are denied the restoration of the fundamental right 
to vote simply because they cannot pay their debts.  This emerging 
justice framework offers an opportunity to shed light on the nature of 
criminal justice debt in the twenty-first century, a prelude to the 
resurgence of debtors’ prison. 
 
 
 304. See id.  According to the New York Times, the Arizona Corrections Department 
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